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Blocking the Loopholes: Nigeria's Post-war Import Control through Expansion of Industries, 1945-1954

Ayodele Samuel ABOLORUNDE [1]

Abstract

The end of the Second World War in 1945 ushered in an important epoch in Nigeria's economic history and this has attracted the interrogation of various historical developments of her post war experience by scholars. This became imperative because the end of the war opened a new chapter in the history of the country. The period marked the beginning of socio-economic and political transformation of colonial Nigeria. To this end, scholars from various disciplines such as economics, sociology, political science and history have paid adequate attention to the country's post-war events. These include, the decolonisation of the country's economy through the prism of economics as a discipline, political decolonizstion, agitations against discriminatory practices against Nigeria's investors and transfer of power from the British to Nigeria's political elite. Similarly, scholars have looked at the contributory roles of Nigerians both military and civilians to the success of British prosecution of the Second World War. However, most of these works did not directly examine how the country regulated her imports through the expansion of industries after the Second World War in 1945 up to 1954 when the colonial government granted the three regions greater autonomy to take certain economic decisions with the limited inputs of the colonial regime. This neglect limits our understanding of Nigeria's post-war economic history. The paper argues that import control through the expansion of industries was deployed as one of the strategies of the decolonisation process which began in the country after 1945.

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1. University of Ibadan, Department of History, Faculty of Arts, Ibadan, Nigeria; abolorunde45@gmail.com

Introduction.
Import control refers to government-initiated barriers to the inflow of goods, implemented through designated agencies; in order to regulate consumption patterns, protect domestic production and secure revenue, safety and consumers' welfare (Abolorunde, 2021:49; Grainger 2009:18). It can be defined as a strategy of changing or sustaining the consumption pattern of a people through barriers against the importation of certain goods into a country as enshrined in the economic policy of a state (Ayodele Samuel Abolorunde, 2021: 49). Control on imports can also be implemented through local production of goods previously imported into a country (Ayodele Samuel Abolorunde, 2021:49). Import control is a policy that emanates from the government through legal instruments (Ayodele Samuel Abolorunde, 2021: 49). Industry refers to organised economic activity involved in processing raw materials into finished goods and services, typically underpinned by capital and technical knowledge. Industry is usually driven by capital and technical knowledge with the aim of achieving domestic production which sustains economic development and consumers' demand (Ekundare, 1973: 176; Kilby, 1969: 81; Olugbaju and Falola, 1996: 230). Industry is a company or organisation that engages in a particular kind of commercial enterprise (Chris B.N Ogbogbo & Ayodele S. Aborisade, 2018: 2). Industry can produce goods and services, as well as consumer goods in commercial quantities (Chris B.N. Ogbogbo &Ayodele S. Aborisade, 2018: 2-3)

All over the world, the evolvement and expansion of industries serve as catalysts for overall economic development. In Britain, the journey to industrial revolution started with the transformation of agricultural industry from subsistence to commercial capacity through the invention of tools such as tractors, ploughs and spinning ginneries (Chris B.N. Ogbogbo & Ayodele S. Aborisade, 2018: 4). Similarly, France witnessed industrial transformation when her craft and agricultural industries enjoyed huge capital allocation in the late 18th century (Hayes & Whithed), 1949: 785). The transformation of craft industry in France therefore enhanced her capacity to establish factories which specialised in the production of pig iron which rose from 100,000 tons in 1815 to 300,000 tons in 1830. (Hayes & Whithed, 1949: 785).

Werner Baer argues that the global economic depression of the 1930s forced most Latin America countries like Brazil, Argentina and Mexico to curtail their imports through the deployment of productive capacity that was hitherto underutilised for the production of textile as this capacity utilisation turned these countries into major exporters of textile in the 1930s (Werner Baer, 1972: 97). Robert Alexandra argues that Cuba discontinued its importation of sugar in 1964 after several years of following the Soviet model by investing heavily in its capacity for sugar production at home through the strategy of import-substitution and this made Cuba a major exporter of sugar (Robert J. Alexandra, 1967: 298). In his own exposition, James McGuire argues that South Korea and Taiwan surpassed Brazil and Argentina in their capacity for exports through massive domestic production with less importation which boosted their Gross Domestic Product GDP and Gross National Product GNP such that by 1990, these Asian Tigers had experienced industrial development than their Latin American Counterparts (James McGuire, 1994: 208).

The industrial capacity of the European powers helped in the colonisation of other parts of the word, including Africa. However, the end of the Second World War in 1945 necessitated the need for the decolonisation of colonial territories at a time when decolonisation assumed greater importance in global consciousness. This compelled various European powers to embark on economic decolonisation knowing full well that expansion of industries would be the catalyst for economic development of their colonies in the post-war era. In its attempt to fulfil the promise of opening the postwar trade in Nigeria, the colonial administration in 1947 enacted the Import Control Regulation of 1947, (Ayodele Samuel Abolorunde (Formerly Aborisade 2019 & 2020: 165) with the aim of accelerating the country's capacity for industrial expansion. This paper therefore focuses on how the colonial government enhanced the country's industrial expansion through import control from the year 1945 when the Second World War ended to 1954 when the colonial administration granted the regions full regional autonomy.

Nigeria's Post-War Historical Trajectory in Literature

Nigeria's post-war experience has attracted scholarly attention of scholars who have examined the country's historical experience after the Second World War from different perspectives. These perspectives are centered around fiscal policy, industrialisation efforts, development planning, agricultural exports, decolonisation, transfer of power, regionalism and constitutional conferences. Scholars have therefore paid adequate attention to various postwar economic reforms and political decisions which drove these reforms. Of all these scholarly interrogations of Nigeria's post-war history, a significant study is the work of Peter Kilby which examines efforts at enthroning full industrialisation in Nigeria (Peter Kilby, 1963: 113). In his own exposition of Nigerian post-war economy, Oyejide postulates that efforts were put in place by the Nigerian government to enhance the capacity of the country's industries from processing of raw materials into finished goods with the aim of erecting favourable fiscal structures, (Oyejide, 1977: 211). In their own argument, Adeyeri and Adejuwon argue that the colonial government identified the potentials of exploring the country's mineral deposits through the services of the expatriate firms, (Adeyeri and Adejuwon, 2012: 14-15). Studies have also been carried out about colonial government's lack of readiness to bequeath technology on the country's industries, (Aworawo, 2011: 270). Attempts at accelerating the country's economic growth through rapid industrialisation were made after the Second World War (Adesina, 1993:154). Study has also shown how Nigeria's foreign reserves before independence were part of the operations of West African Currency Board (WACB) while the country's non-pounds sterling earnings were deposited in London (Ayodele Samuel Aborisade, 2018: 95). Balogun and Adesanya have interrogated the dynamic nature of Nigeria's maritime space by extension, the country's import sector (Balogun, W.A., & Adesanya, O.P, 2024:295). Balogun and Adesanya's intellectual interrogation has been corroborated by Bello and Isah Ya'u when they argue that the British penetration of the Nigerian area and the conquest of its people led to the navigation of the country's navigable waters from South to North which facilitated the movement of goods and services to a number of ports in different parts of the country for consumption in the hinterland (Bello, M.A., &Ya'u, U.I, 2024: 489).

While earlier studies have examined post-war industrialisation, trade policy and decolonisation, they have not taken import control through industrial expansion as a central analytical tool for the period 1945-1954 using the archival materials as s veritable source of historical reconstruction. This exclusion makes this study important to us because one of the strategies of revamping the country's postwar economy was the deployment of import control tool through the expansion of industries within the Nigerian economy. The conventional wisdom on the subject matter of Nigeria's postwar history centred around external trade, (Olukoju, 2002: 374), indigenous entrepreneurship, (Akeredolu-Ale, 1977:51), transfer of power, (Lawal, 1994), investors who were interested in investing in industries as well as importers who were eligible for concession were not discouraged. (Abolorunde, Ayodele Samuel, 2019: 123).

However, A.A. Lawal drawing on the effects of the decolonisation on the British postwar economic policies challenged the conventional wisdom by maintaining that postwar political and economic agitations in Nigeria compelled the British to embark on industrial expansion, (Lawal, 1987: 122). Ekundare corroborated this evidence when he argues that the colonial government encouraged the establishment of cotton industry and palm oil mills with the objective of expanding Nigeria's processing industries after the war. (Ekundare, 1973: 281 & 283). Similarly, Ralph Austen argues that the end of the Second World War compelled the British to embark on the economic restructuring of their colonies, (Ralph Austen, 1987: 1987: 204). A.G. Hopkins postulates that attempt made by the British at industrial expansion in their colonies in West Africa from 1945 could not mitigate the hardship suffered by indigenous interest groups who were willing to invest in modern industries, (A.G. Hopkins, 1974: 263).

Apart from Lawal and Ekundare's analyses on how the colonial regime made attempts at enhancing the country's industrial capacity after the war, this paper argues that Nigeria's industrial capacity after the Second World War was significantly shaped and enhanced by policies of import control, implemented through the expansion of selected industries. The main thesis contends that these measures formed part of an ambivalent decolonisation strategy which, while encouraging certain forms of local production, preserved a dependent and limited pattern of industrial development that primarily served British post-war economic interests. While extant studies have examined Nigeria's post-war economic history, expansion of industries through import control has been a neglected theme. The result of this has been the lack of holistic understanding of the dynamics of Nigeria's post-war economy and the country's strategy of decolonisation from economic prism. It is a contribution to the study of colonial rule and moves Nigeria's postwar history in new directions.

The study relies essentially on primary sources such as archival documents derived from the National Archives Ibadan as well as newspapers from the archives. Secondary sources were derived from books and journal articles. These sources provided data for historical reconstruction of the subject matter under interrogation. Data gathered were subjected to historical analysis. The study is divided into five sections, section one introduces the topic; section two examines the nature of Nigeria's import control towards the end of the war; section three interrogates the expansion of post-war infant industries in Nigeria through import control, 1945-1951; section four discusses colonial government's strategy of regional spread of industries against imports, 1952-1954 and the conclusion.

The Nature of Nigeria's import control Towards the end of the War

As the Second World War was drawing to a close, the necessity of post-war economic recovery of Europe, including Britain, positioned Nigerian economy for huge export of raw materials to the metropolitan capital after the war. Similarly, Nigerian export to Europe towards the end of the war in 1945 further stimulated industrial investments in the metropoles as this raised the level of African imports from Europe (Ralph Austen, 1987:205). As the war was drawing to a close, the quantum of opportunities which the postwar Nigerian economy was going to provide did not diminish completely the problem of importation. This problem of importation was traceable to the inter-war years when the foreign importing firms enjoyed so much commercial privileges. By implication, this commercial autonomy positioned the European firms as regulators of imports into Nigeria (Ayodele Samuel Abolorunde, 2019: 164).

However, the problem against Nigerian importers was internally and externally orchestrated. Internally, the Association of West African Merchants A.W.A.M appeared to have internal division because of the emergence of Nigerian Association of African Importers and Exporters, a body whose voice was not known at the peak of import restrictions during the Second World War. The emergence of this body was a direct challenge to the dominance of A.WA.M as the only business and trading association known to the colonial government. Furthermore, the association's strategy of presenting itself as the mouth piece of Nigerian importers and exporters also created division among its members.

A good scenario of this division was the protest letter dated 23rd of February, 1945 written by one wholesales colonial trading company disassociating itself from the import quota given to it in order to import Pearl Buttons from the United States under the auspices of Nigerian Association of African Importers and Exporters (National Archives Ibadan, DCI1/1/4032/ S:193 Import Control: Nigerian Association of Importers and Exporters, 1945-1947). The company accused one Mr. Amos, the Secretary of the association of distributing import quotas without the knowledge of the company (NAI, DCI1/1/4032/S:193 Import Control: Nigerian Association of Importers and Exporters, 1945-1947). The company in its estimation felt its import quota was supposed to be higher than was it received.

The colonial government through the Director of Supplies, A.Y Cann upheld the position of the wholesales trading companies based on its past import performance which surpassed that of Nigerian Association of African Importers and Exporters put together (NAI, DCI1/1/4032/S:193 Import Control: Nigerian Association of Importers and Exporters, 1945-1947). A stern warning was issued by the importing authorities that another protest from any so-called member of the association could lead to complete review of the association's import quota for the year 1945 (NAI, DCI1/1/4032/S:193 Import Control: Nigerian Association of Importers and Exporters, 1945-1947). Internal squabble within A.W.A.M warranted the evolvement of the Nigerian association of importers and exporters. The protest letter of the wholesales trading company equally reveals the level of division among the members of the latter. This division provided the platform for external intervention of the colonial regime in the distribution of import quota of Nigerian importers. The wartime regulation of imports by the colonial regime which was further accentuated by the internal squabbles among importers positioned it for strategic protection of the British economic interests within the Nigerian economy when expansion of industries as one of the tools of decolonisation began after the Second World War.

The Expansion of Post-War Infant Industries in Nigeria through Import Control, 1945-1951

Import control which assumed flexible dimension after the Second World War did not erase completely the rigid structure of import regulation. This rigid structure was compelled by the need to implement the 1946 Ten-Year Development Plan designed to put Nigeria on a path of sustainable development as mapped out in a post-war-policy of the colonial administration. In order to achieve this noble vision of economic restructuring, import duties on goods brought into the country were increased while import tariffs were even doubled on some notable items such as alcoholic liquors, bicycles, cotton piece goods, motor vehicles, building materials, petroleum oil and cigarettes (Ekundare, 1973: 234). The strengthening of fiscal portfolio of the government was aimed at protecting the newly established Nigerian industries. The concomitant increase of import duties aimed at protecting the industries coincided with the period that revenue needed to sustain expansion of industries as part of Development Plan evolved through phenomenal increase in export trade of agricultural produce of Nigeria which stood at 23.7million pounds in 1946 as this was due to worldwide shortages of many raw materials experienced immediately after the Second World War. (Ekundare, 1973: 225).

The tightening of import duties and the expansion of industries under the policy of Ten-Year Development Plan of 1946 appears to be circumstantial for the Nigerian government due to favourable scenario which played out in Nigeria's post-war export trade. This positioned the colonial government to intensify its efforts on expansion of industries in Nigeria. The government under this circumstance was able to protect the existing industries through import restrictions with capacity for further expansion through favourable export trade. Some of the importing firms deemed it appropriate to produce what was previously imported in large quantity locally. A good example of this was United Africa Company U.A.C., which established a small factory that produced tiles in June, 1948 while some Nigerian importers like Chief Odutola who collaborated with four Africans and four British to set up a brick and tile factory in Lagos in December, 1948 with equally divided capital of 6,000 pounds at the first instance (NAI, DCI 1/1/750/S:5 Pottery and Tile Industries Afikpo and Ishiago, 1947-1950).

The colonial government through the Department of Commerce and Industry (DCI) and Public Works Department demonstrated its readiness to support the expansion of industries provided it carried with it substantial African capital with Africans as part of top management staff (NAI, DCI 1/1/750/S:5 Pottery and Tile Industries Afikpo and Ishiago, 1947-1950). The Department of Commerce and Industries in collaboration with the Department of Special Duties also assisted in the establishment of brick-making plant at Enugu (NAI, DCI 1/1/750/S:5 Pottery and Tile Industries Afikpo and Ishiago, 1947-1950). This initiative was contained in the deliberations between Mr. G.W. Taylor and Dr. Raeburn of DCI and Special Duties respectively as they proposed Enugu as the site of the plant due to availability of coal as a source of power supply offered by Colliery Department (NAI, DCI 1/1/750/S:5 Pottery and Tile Industries Afikpo and Ishiago, 1947-1950).

By March, 1950, arrangement was concluded to import brick-plant from the United Kingdom by John Whitehead of Preston in collaboration with the Crown Agents in London while one Mr. C.J. Tidy, a brick and tile expert was saddled with the obligation of recruiting tile officers (NAI, DCI 1/1/750/S:5 Pottery and Tile Industries Afikpo and Ishiago, 1947-1950). The expansion of industries was intrinsically linked to sufficient demand for manufactured goods (Peter Kilby, 1969: 26). This was due to the country's large market in the face of its low per capital income of about 30 pounds with the population of 30 million in 1950 (Peter Kilby, 1969: 26). Kilby in his argument posits that industrial activities pegged imports at 20 to 25% of the country's total expenditure with the Nigerian market serving as its prime asset of distribution of goods produced locally (Peter Kilby, 1969: 27-28). One of the strategies adopted to reduce imports was the encouragement of the commercial activities of some intending industries that were willing to operate within the Nigerian economy with minimum restrictions.

A good example of this was the strategic penetration of some United States investors into the Nigerian economy in 1950 as the United States Consul General Willard Quincy Stanton in a letter dated 19th of August, 1950 requested from the Department of Commerce and Industries the possibility of establishing meat packing, canning, sausage industry in Nigeria (NAI, DCI1/1/730 A Correspondence between the United States Consul-General in Lagos Nigeria, Willard Quincy Stanton and Office of the Director, Department of Commerce and Industries on the Development of Minor Industries, 1944-1958). The response of the colonial government was apt in protecting the existing industries that were producing these products through the commercial initiatives of Nigerians. The Nigerian government turned down this request because industries such as Lisabi Mills at Yaba and Awanka Limited, Simpson Street, Ebute Lagos already had packing and canning factories that produced fruits, fish, vegetables, Bacon and Clarified Butter Fat on a commercial scale (NAI,DCI1/1/730 A Correspondence between the United States Consul-General in Lagos Nigeria, Willard Quincy Stanton and Office of the Director, Department of Commerce and Industries on the Development of Minor Industries, 1944-1958). This rejection by the Nigerian government reveals the capacity for scrutinising the importation of services of industries from the developed economies because the high import tariff which reduced importation of some consumable and non-consumable goods from these countries had affected their export profile into the Nigerian market.

From the foregoing, it could be argued that the huge potential of the Nigerian market necessitated the need for the expansion of industries. The import regulation of the colonial government vis-à-vis expansion of industries attracted the views of the educated elite who saw the expansion as an important instrument of launching the country on a path of sustainable development as this position was re-echoed in the editorial of the *Nigerian Tribune* of 29th of November, 1950 (Anon: Start More Industries *The Nigerian Tribune* of 29th November, 1950, p.21). Nigerians were encouraged to desist from relying solely on importation by exploiting the opportunities inherent in the Nigerian markets through the establishment of industries that were economically viable than trading on imported raw materials that had the capacity to stifle the country's capacity for expansion in terms of industries (Anon: Start More Industries *The Nigerian Tribune* of 29th November, 1950, p.21).

Indeed, the country's capacity for expansion was hindered by the dominance of foreign capital in this expansion of industries as expatriate dominance was evidently palpable in the field of manufacturing by 1950 (Festus Iyayi, 1989: 5). Sectors such as oil milling, tobacco, beer and soft drinks manufacture and saw milling in 1950 were driven and dominated by foreign capital (Festus Iyayi, 1989: 6) This pattern of foreign investment has been described by Ake as the spread of capitalism in the colony as this accelerated the systematic integration of the colony into the world capitalist system as well as the strategic restriction of a small class of indigenous capitalists who were eager to exploit to the fullest the benefits which emanated from foreign capital (Claude Ake, 1981: 39). The size of the Nigerian market compelled both foreign and indigenous investors to make their investment decisions according to the necessities of the process of accumulation, particularly the quest for profits on investment within a short time (Claude Ake, 1981: 46).

Contrary to Kilby's argument that the Nigerian market positioned her to industrialise, tariff wall erected as import duties by the colonial regime was not tailored towards genuine industrialisation because the industries that were expanded did not produce heavy machinery, but manufacturing products such as tiles, bricks and consumer goods. However, the expansion of industries through high import tariff encouraged industrial activities of foreign and indigenous investors because of protective wall of import duties. This high import tariff dictated the choices of the investors. Their choices of investment were also dictated by the need to avoid the importation of heavy equipment and machinery that carried with them high import duties. By implication, expansion of industries under the policy rubric of import control after the Second World War was not introduced in order to bequeath on Nigeria, comprehensive industrial transformation. This was further perpetuated by both the colonial state and the choices of the investors.

By December 1950, a proposal was drawn up to establish citrus or fruit factory in which pineapples were to be processed in the proposed new factory at Okigwi in the Eastern Province with the growers of fruits such as pineapples being assisted financially through viable cooperative basis for fruits to be delivered regularly for processing in this factory (NAI, CDB2 Policy: Specific Industries Confidential Report of the Chief Secretary's Office, Nigeria, 1950). This strategy of effective assemblage was designed to wrestle from U.A.C., the collection of raw fruits from the farmers at Okigwi (NAI, CDB2 Policy: Specific Industries Confidential Report of the Chief Secretary's Office, Nigeria, 1950). One can contend or argue that the strategy of the colonial government to reduce the influence of influential firms like U.A.C., over Nigeria's quest for expansion of industries through active involvement of government in the establishment of consumer goods industries was the realisation of the fact that imports duties that were prohibitive may not hinder the capacity of these firms from importing certain machineries. This in the estimation of the colonial regime was capable of sustaining their dominance of the Nigerian economy as this was capable of putting indigenous investors and other players of the country's economy in an unpleasant position.

The position of the colonial government in achieving this objective reflected in the way it demonstrated its readiness to establish food processing factory on soundest lines which benefited local growers of raw fruits who previously depended on cocoa as an export commodity for revenue generation (NAI, CDB2 Policy: Specific Industries Confidential Report of the Chief Secretary's Office, Nigeria, 1950). The encouragement given to production of fruits for domestic expansion of industries was strategic. This was to ensure that economic empowerment of indigenous businessmen who were playing important role in the expansion of industries was not restricted to the export of cash crop. Since enhanced import duties on goods outside the country was capable of discouraging established importing firms, capital accumulated by interested businessmen positioned them to compete with these firms because their source of accumulating such capital had been diversified through the cultivation of crops that were commercialised domestically.

Apart from consumable goods, the opportunities offered by high import tariff further encouraged the colonial government to initiate the expansion of textile production through mass production of fibre as an import material of textile. To this end, officials of the colonial government liaised with members of the Nigerian fibre Industries Mission and other stakeholders in textile manufacturing at a meeting held on the 22nd of June, 1951 (NAI, DCI1/1/789/2 Nigerian Sacks: Report on the Proposed Project to Manufacture Sacks and other Fibres Products in Nigeria using both Indigenous and Imported Raw Materials, 1951). Representing the Nigerian government at the meeting were, Mr. H.R.E. Brown, Acting Development Secretary as the Chairman, Mr. R.W. Baker-Beal, Mr. M. Park, Acting Director of Agriculture, Mr. H.B. Cox, Director of Commerce and Industries. Mr. R.A. Crofts, Acting Director of Marketing and Export, Mr. A.E. Southern, Principal Textile Officer and Mr. K.J. Hilton of Nigerian Secretariat (NAI, DCI1/1/789/2 Nigerian Sacks: Report on the Proposed Project to Manufacture Sacks and other Fibres Products in Nigeria using both Indigenous and Imported Raw Materials, 1951).

Representing the Fibre Industries Mission and the Colonial Development Corporation were: Mr. S.J. Pears of Messrs. Cooper Brother &Co., as the Chairman of the Mission, Mr. D.C. Hobson, Secretary to the Mission. Mr. J.A. Murray, Mr. A.E. C. Harvey, Cotton Mill Specialist, Mr. A.C. Baxter, Fibre specialist, Colonial Development Corporation, Mr. G. Egerton Mott, Colony Representative, Colonial Development Corporation and Mr. J.E Lejeune, Finance Director (West Africa), Colonial Development Corporation (NAI, DCI1/1/789/2 Nigerian Sacks: Report on the Proposed Project to Manufacture Sacks and other Fibres Products in Nigeria using both Indigenous and Imported Raw Materials, 1951).

Deliberations at the meeting were centred on the establishment of a sack factory whose source of raw materials must be based on an adequate supply of local fibre of the right quality while the idea of using imported jute in large quantity for the factory project was discouraged at the meeting since that was going to be economically unwise due to high import tariff (NAI, DCI1/1/789/2 Nigerian Sacks: Report on the Proposed Project to Manufacture Sacks and other Fibres Products in Nigeria using both Indigenous and Imported Raw Materials, 1951). The representatives of the Nigerian government agreed with members of Nigerian fibres industries that the enhancement of market potentials and production capacity of the factory to also produce grey yarn for effective textile production depended on the commitment of the colonial government (NAI, DCI1/1/789/2 Nigerian Sacks: Report on the Proposed Project to Manufacture Sacks and other Fibres Products in Nigeria using both Indigenous and Imported Raw Materials, 1951).

The attitude of the colonial government toward high import tariff in the early 1950s emanated from the need to protect the country's infant industries from the competition of more mature and financially buoyant importing firms that served as rivals of the newly established industries (T.A. Oyejide, 1975: 33). The imposition of increased import tariff may not have offered absolute protection to the industries but the need to intensify the intensity of domestic demand (T.A. Oyejide, 1975: 34) and expansion of Nigerian market positioned the industries for expansion.

The need to exploit these market opportunities propelled some indigenous investors to look for ways through which their industries can be expanded. A good example of this was the request made by one Nzeakor Motor Repairs Training and Transport Service responsible for general repairs of motor parts to the Colonial Development Board for a loan of 1000 pounds for possible expansion of the factory in February, 1951 (NAI, DCI1/1/730/S:11

Minor Industries Enquiries, 1951-1958). The response of the colonial authorities to that request remains unclear due to absence of empirical fact.

However, the commitment of the colonial regime to the expansion of small-scale industries was unwavering. Good examples of this commitment with possible reduction of imports was the assistance offered to one Mr. J.F. Kamson, a Nigerian investor who established a small weaving mill of 50 looms with the installation of machinery imported from the United Kingdom with the factory gulping about thirty-five thousand pounds of which thirty thousand pounds was loaned by the Colonial Development Loan Board to Kamson in 1951 (NAI, DCI1/1/730 Development of Minor Industries, 1944-1958). The commitment to develop the agricultural sector as the pre-condition to the expansion of industries by the colonial administration was equally palpable. The colonial government's position on this aligns with the argument of Axel Harneit-Sievers that the colonial government encouraged African entrepreneurs to venture into the manufacturing sector hitherto dominated by European investors with the aim of expanding the frontiers of that sector (Axel Harneit-Sievers, 1996: 51).

This was demonstrated through the encouragement given to investors of the agricultural sector and industries who produced consumer goods by the colonial government. These investors were encouraged to attend an exhibition in London called Smithfield Club, the Agricultural Engineers Association and the Society of Motor Manufacturing and Traders (NAI, DCI1/1/730/S:11 Minor Industries Enquiries, 1951-1958). Be that as it may, the colonial government in its bid to enhance the potency of the agricultural sector for possible expansion of industries designed to curb import receipt of the country on consumer goods embarked on the construction of twenty-seven palm oil small factories with monetary value of 400,000 pounds (NAI, DCI1/1/730/S:11 Minor Industries Enquiries, 1951-1958). Four of the mills were completed while the remaining ones were under construction when they were handed over to the Eastern Region Production Development Board on the 1st of October, 1951 (NAI, DCI1/1/730 Development of Minor Industries, 1944-1958). In a similar vein, the government through Department of Commerce and Industries established similar oil mills in the Northern Region with the monetary value of 30,000 pounds when they were handed over to Northern Region Production Development Board in 1951 (NAI, DCI1/1/730 Development of Minor Industries, 1944-1958).

The colonial government embarked on this effort of agricultural expansion in order to give some gravitas to the expansion of industries against imports. As stated earlier, this necessitated the essence of encouraging investors of the Nigerian economy to attend overseas exhibition in order to enhance the dynamics of mechanised agriculture and inspiring capacity to manufacture equipment for its expansion (NAI, DCI1/1/730/S:11 Minor Industries Enquiries, 1951-1958). The encouragement offered was sustained through the offering of free tickets to interested Nigerian investors to the exhibition in December, 1951 (NAI, DCI1/1/730/S:11 Minor Industries Enquiries, 1951-1958). The colonial government in its estimation believed that international exposure and techniques of manufacturing of the investors will further complement the protective measure put in place through high import duties.

This protective measure was to provide the country's local industries assured market in which investors who were previously indulging in importation in Nigeria were rewarded with effective exclusion from competition (Peter Kilby, 1969: 43) of imported goods. The government continued with its policy of reducing manufactured imports in order to ameliorate the balance of payments problems (E.J. Usoro, 1977: 69) of the colonial economy. This amelioration was further enhanced through adequate information supplied by government agencies such as the Institute of Industrial Research, Lagos Industrial Estate and Loans Board (E.J. Usoro, 1977: 65). Liberal fiscal policy such as tax reduction was demonstrated towards newly established industries and this was further backed by frequent overseas campaigns for the establishment of industries in Nigeria backed by liberal industrial laws (E.J. Usoro, 1977: 65).

VALUES OF IMPORTS BY PRINCIPAL COUNTRIES IN THOUSANDS OF POUNDS: STERLING AREAS

	1939	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951
United Kingdom	3648	16,164	21,362	29,250	37,024	43,467
Hong Kong	21	40	151	216	340	578
India	429	2,027	2,198	3,509	3,755	4,943
South Africa	4	267	196	165	375	425
Southern Rhodesia		62	143	86	199	345
Other countries	72	316	140	238	240	716
Total	4,174	18,876	24,190	33,464	41,933	50,474

Table 1 Figure 1 Source: NAE: Handbook of Commerce and Industry in Nigeria, 1952. Department of Commerce and Industry, Lagos

A critical examination of the above table shows that imports of the principal countries into Nigeria during the war was highly insignificant but the total value of post-war importation of these countries increased by 350% between 1939 and 1947. It could be deduced from the table that between 1947 and 1951 the unprecedented increase witnessed after the war was stable as this increase fluctuated between 35% and 25%. The stability could be linked to the changing nature of import control of the post-war period. Mathematically speaking, the table reveals Britain as the largest exporter into the Nigerian market with total value of 150,915 pounds nine times more than what was exported by India the second largest exporter into the Nigerian market with total value of 16,861 pounds eleven times more than the imports from South Africa and Hong Kong with total import value of 1,432 and 1,346 respectively.



Figure 2 Source: Graph drawn by the author through the table above. See table 1 figure 1

Mathematical interpretation of the graph shows that the import value from Britain during and after the war was nine times higher than other countries of the sterling area. This shows that imports from British dominions were restricted by the colonial government while imports from the metropolitan capital were equally restricted during the war. This could be seen in the low level of import value of Britain during the war. It equally reveals the rigid nature of import control during the war. The chart shows that the post-war period positioned Britain as the largest exporter into the Nigerian market and this shows that Britain used its influence as the metropolitan country to revamp its economy after the end of the war through its exports into Nigeria.

Colonial Government's Strategy of Regional Spreading of Industries against Imports, 1952-1954

By 1952, the colonial government enacted the Pioneer Industry Ordinance with the aim of boosting domestic production against imports and the ordinance had the following provisions:

> Any company, or persons proposing to register a company, being desirous of establishing or participating in a pioneer industry for the purpose of producing any pioneer product or products and intending that a factory be constructed in Nigeria for such purpose, may make an application in writing to the Minister for

> a pioneer certificate, or for a pioneer certificate to be given when the proposed company has been registered. (NAI, Pioneer Industries Ordinance of 1952 Published in the Gazette of 1952)

The ordinance stipulated the conditions that allowed industries established by indigenous and foreign investors to enjoy tax relief provided they were willing to commence operations within a reasonable time. The construction of their factory or mining operation was aimed at sustaining the expansion of industries and accumulation of capital needed for development of Nigeria (NAI, Pioneer Industries Ordinance of 1952 Published in the Gazette of 1952). The special provision for tax relief as embedded in the ordinance stated that:

> Where tax relief period of a pioneer company has been extended by one year under sub-section (2), and the Minister is satisfied that the pioneer company has incurred, by the end of that one year, fixed capital expenditure of not less than £100,000, the Minister shall make a second direction further extending its tax relief period by two years from the end of such one year. (NAI, Pioneer Industries Ordinance of 1952 Published in the Gazette of 1952)

One can argue that tax relief granted to the pioneer industries was not comprehensive when one examines the import tariff paid on machinery and equipment used in establishing some of the industries. What the colonial government did was to recoup part of the money gained by the industries under the auspices of tax relief through import tariff. The industries established under the Pioneer Industry Ordinance were further prevented from obtaining loans without the consent or approval of the government that was in a position to examine and ensure adequate security and reasonable rate of interests needed before the granting of such loans (NA1, Pioneer Industries Ordinance of 1952 Published in the Gazette of 1952).

Furthermore, the Ordinance compelled the industries under the tax relief programme to divert profits emanating from their commercial enterprise during the period of tax holiday (NA1, Pioneer Industries Ordinance of 1952 Published in the Gazette of 1952). The Ordinance granted an extension of one year tax relief to industries that accumulated Fifteen Thousand Pounds, while three years extension was granted to industries that accumulated One Hundred Thousand Pounds after the expiration of initial tax relief for the purpose of expanding production of factories established under the Ordinance (NA1, Pioneer Industries Ordinance of 1952 Published in the Gazette of 1952). The ordinance has been described by historians and economists as an instrument that sustained rigid colonial structure of the Nigerian economy. It was criticised due to its rigid nature that did not sufficiently attract Nigerian investors who would have keyed into the Ordinance to set up industries because it favoured British private investment as it manifested in other British colonial territories such as Ghana and East African territories (E.J. Usoro, 1977: 66). The quest for curbing importation through the expansion of industries necessitated the need for the importation of certain machineries as this required the issuance of a licence. To this end, Customs Ordinance Chapter 48 also known as Control on Imports Order in Council 1950 that focused on the issuance of Quota Licence was amended in 1952 with the following provisions:

> Importers that all Quota Licence issued under the Nigeria Defence (control of Imports) Regulation, 1939 (as subsequently amended from time to time are revoked with effects from the 31st of March, 1952. The Quota Licence is to be replaced by a special General Licence. (NAI, DCI1/1/CS411B Import Control Special General Licence Civilization of Intra European Trade, 1949-1952)

A close observation of the colonial import policy vis-à-vis expansion of industries depicts a close monitoring of profits that accrued from it as stipulated in the Pioneer Industries Ordinance with restrictions that prevented the re-investment of these profits outside what was registered as a product or products of the industries. This restriction on the profits realized would have had two effects on the colonial economy. First, lack of diversion of profits as stipulated in the ordinance for the production of other products outside the registered products hindered considerably, the expansion of industries in a multifaceted manner. Second, the re-investment of profits on the same products registered for production surpassed the domestic demands and this would have automatically boosted the export profile of the country.

High import duties paid on imported machinery and equipment by these industries would have gulped chunk of what was realised under tax relief introduced through the Industries Ordinance. By implication, the colonial government received part of tax concession granted to these industries through high import duties which were inescapable for industries established. In addition, the expansion of industries under the policy of high import duties which served as restrictions on imports boosted the country's capacity to produce certain raw materials such as semi-finished goods for exports to the global market. It can be posited that the expansion of industries as a strategy of import control was used by the British to sustain post-war reconstruction of the British economy.

Despite these shortcomings of expansion of industries, the size of the Nigerian market was big enough to sustain the expansion but the colonial Industries Ordinance did not give room for unrestricted expansion of these industries. This restriction in terms of re-investment of capital in other enterprise did not enable developing economy like Nigeria to transit from comprehensive importation to full domestic production (Peter Kilby, 1969: 53) that would have curbed to the barest minimum importation of goods with high duties on them. Their capacity to engage in domestic production was what Chukwu describes as the empowerment of indigenous investors by indigenous banks through liberalised credit that was made available with the aim of enthroning economic liberation of the Nigerian economy (Dan Chukwu, 2010: 102). It was the attempt to reduce importation so as to pave way for the expansion of industries that made the import bureaucracies such as Customs, Import Control Office and Nigerian exchange control to revoke the Quota Licence in January, 1952 for Special General Licence which was designed to raise more taxes than Quota Licence. (NAI DCI 1/1/ CS 411B Import Control: Special General Licence (Civilization of Intra European Trade, 1949-1952).

The Special General Licence was designed by import bureaucracy to ensure importers did not breach procedures of importation. Import contracts that were in existence prior to 29th of February, 1952 were allowed in terms of importation of goods into the country in collaboration with exporting agents and banks of the country of origin where the goods were previously imported under Quota Licence before its revocation in January, 1952 (NAI DCI 1/1/ CS 411B Import Control: Special General Licence Civilisation of Intra European Trade, 1949-1952).

However, it was this tariff protection and fiscal incentives that Kilby describes as profitable opportunities inherent in the market as this shaped the consideration of investors in terms of investment in industries (Peter Kilby, 1969: 53). It is plausible to state that the tariff protection of the colonial administration and liberalised credit facilities by the indigenous banks to boost manufacturing against import was consistent with what Arturo Alessandri of Chile deployed to protect the local industries as a means of import substitution through the offering of soft loans to local producers with tariff protection (Eduardo Silver, 2007:72). Opportunities offered by the expansion of industries intensified competition among investors within and outside the country as these investors were interested in exploiting these opportunities as well as the importing firms. One of such foreign investors interested in investing in Nigeria was the British Celanese Company (NAI, DCII/1/418/S11 Visit of the British Celanese Representatives, 1952).

The company in its bid to establish garment factory in Nigeria wrote from London to Mr. R.F.A. Grey, Nigerian Development Secretary who equally briefed Mr. D.H. Rosser, Trade Commissioner for Nigeria on the intention of the company to establish garment factories in Ibadan, Aba, Enugu and Port Harcourt between October and November, 1952 (NAI, DCI 1/1/418/S 11A Correspondence between R.F.A Grey, Development Secretary, Nigerian Secretary and D.H Rosser, Trade Commissioner for Nigeria, October, 1952). By 29th of October, 1952, the Commissioner for Trade in collaboration with the Department of Commerce and Industries notified Assistant Directors of Commerce and Industries in Enugu, Aba, Port Harcourt and Ibadan (NAI, DCII/1/418/S11 Visit of the British Celanese Representatives, 1952). Important departments such as textile and dye units within Department of Commerce and Industries in Lagos were carried along concerning this important enquiry of the British Celanese Company. (NAI, DCII/1/418/S11 Visit of the British Celanese Representatives, 1952). By 3rd of November, 1952, the representatives of the company, Mr. M. Spilman and Mr. A.J.R. Steele began the tour of the areas mapped out in the country with the representatives making comprehensive inquiry from the Department of Commerce and Industries about the country's Labour Code Ordinance, The Trades Dispute Arbitration and Enquiry Ordinance No. 219 and Workmens Compensation Ordinance 234. (NAI, DCII/1/418/S11 Visit of the British Celanese Representatives, 1952)

The representatives were highly impressed by the market potentials of the country, these potentials to them were capable of enhancing the expansion of their proposed garment factories in accordance with the laid down laws governing the expansion of industries in Nigeria. Available data did not reveal whether the garment factories were eventually established in Nigeria. However, one can infer with considerable degree of certainty that those factories would have been established given the nature of unflinching support of the colonial government to the company. The opportunities and inherent competition of the Nigerian market compelled some of the importing and general trading companies to transform themselves into manufacturing outfits due to the restriction placed on import-wholesale trade (Peter Kilby, 1969: 66) by high import duties and opportunities offered by expansion of industries. The declining prospects of import trade through high import duties compelled importing firm like Paterson and Zochonis P.Z., to increase its investment in industries in partnership with a Greek soap maker P.B. Nicholas that had been in existence since 1949 and in 1952 bought Nicholas' interests in the soap making factory by recruiting skilled workers like technical personnel for further expansion and possible growth of the factory. (Peter Kilby, 1969: 72)

Similarly, the colonial government through the Department of Commerce and Industry in 1952 assisted in the expansion of Kano Citizen Trading Company of Kano, a small weaving mill of 50 looms whose machinery was imported from the United Kingdom in order to enhance its production under the supervision of Mill Officer appointed by D.C.I., before it was handed over fully to Department of Commerce and Industries, DCI in 1954 (NAI, DCI1/1/730 Development of Minor Industries, 1944-1958). The colonial government equally imported machinery and equipment to enhance local production of soap in the country when it established soap making factory in the western region (NAI, DCI1/1/730 Development of Minor Industries, 1944-1958). The accessibility of the factory to raw materials needed for its expansion was enhanced by the establishment of ten palm oil mills in 1952 with monetary value of 230,000 pounds as at the time they were handed over to Western Region Production Development Board on the 1st of January, 1953 (NAI, DCI1/1/730 Development of Minor Industries, 1944-1958).

By 1953, other notable importing firms like John Holt and U.A.C., in Nigeria keyed into the idea of investing in industries when the two importing firms induced the British construction firm of Taylor Woodrow to come to Nigeria and provided half of the capital of the holding which enhanced the prospects of furniture factory that was subsequently established in that year in Lagos (Peter Kilby, 1969: 72). While the influx of foreign investors continued unabated, the colonial government to a large extent, tried to protect the interests of indigenous investors who were also involved in the establishment of small industries in Nigeria. A good example of protection demonstrated was the assessment of an industry based in London named H. Nobles Coopers Limited which specialised in the production of iron and steel related materials such as containers, Barrels, Casks and drums (NAI, DCI1/1/730/S:11 Minor Industries Enquiries, 1951-1958). The colonial government through the Department of Commerce and Industry in

1953 responded to the request of H. Nobles strategically by encouraging competition between the company and those industries with domineering outlook in the Nigerian economy, while the interests of some well-established firms and indigenous industries were protected (NAI, DCI1/1/730/S:11 Minor Industries Enquiries, 1951-1958).

Import Duties by Important Commodities in Millions and thousands of Pounds Table 2 figure 3

Items	1952-53	1951-52
cotton piece Goods	2,985,000	2,181,000
Tobacco, unmanufactured	2,887,000	3,216,000
Artificial Silk Manufactures (wholly or partly of Artificial Silk	1,411,000	1,080,000
Oils, Motor Spirit	1,184,000	995,000
Metals and Metal Manufactures	915,000	683,000
Spirits, potable	721,000	656,000
Oils, illuminating	606,000	546,000
Vehicles abd Parts for Road Transport	590,000	561,000
Ale, Beer, Stout and Porter	493,000	528,000
Apparel	395,000	393,000
Perfumery (other than toilet soaps or perfumed spirits)	333,000	335,000
Salt	298,000	361,000
Tobacco, Cigarette	271,000	801,000
Cement	228,000	209,000
Fish	213,000	191,000
Paper, including newsprint	180,000	181,000
Vehicle Tyres and Tubes	162,000	441,000
Matches	155,000	256,000
Chemicals	144,000	132,000
Oils, lubricating	68,000	96,000
Parcel Post	286,000	258,000
Other Imports	2,198,000	2,638,000
1. Statistical Duty	16,723,000	16,738,000
2. Gross Collection	16,676,000	16,785,000
3. Net Revenue	16,606,690	16,703,790

Source: NAE: Annual Report of Her Majesty's Customs and Excise Department for the Year Ended 31st March, 1953.

The above table shows the trend of huge importation of textile into the Nigerian market and this appears to be consistent with the huge importation of finished Japanese and semi-finished Japanese textile that was processed in the United Kingdom before importation into the Nigerian market. The dominance of textile in the country's import profile during this period depicts the collaborative effort of Britain with the United States in the revamping of post-war Japanese economy. Since textile was imported from Britain during this period, the British equally used the Nigerian market as a strategy of restructuring their economy in the post-war period. The importation of metal and metal manufacture different from heavy metal into the Nigerian market during this period witnessed unprecedented increase probably because of the establishment of industries of the 1950s. By implication, the restriction on imports through the establishment of industries further encouraged the importation of metal related materials into the country. This also reflected in the importation of raw tobacco for processing by industries established in Nigeria as this further curtailed the importation of cigarette into the country during this period. See the above table for the importation of cigarette.



Figure 4 Source: Graph drawn by the author through the table above. See table 2 figure 3

The above graph shows that the country generated huge revenue from the importation of goods that were not produced in the country. This could be seen in the pattern of the country's net revenue profile from 1951 to 1953 as the country earned 33,310, 480 pounds sterling as import duties. Import duties generated as revenue during this period of expansion of industry would have enhanced the country's readiness to sustain this expansion as a buffer against imports. In dismantling the octopus commercial interests of some industries, the Department of Commerce and Industry dictated the commercial interest of H. Nobles by unambiguously stating that the company can only establish drum producing industry in Nigeria. (NAI, DCI1/1/730/S:11 Minor Industries Enquiries, 1951-1958).

This in the estimation of the colonial government was capable of reducing the unhindered commercial stature of Metal Containers of West Africa Limited that had succeeded in establishing drums factories in Apapa, Lagos, Kano and neighbouring French colonial territories such as, Dahomey now (Republic of Benin), Niger, French Cameroons and Chad (NAI, DCI1/1/730/S:11 Minor Industries Enquiries, 1951-1958). The colonial government further stated that the company cannot produce wooden casks used in the palm oil industry because its previous importation by U.A.C., from Belgium had been reduced substantially since 1952 when Industries Ordinance was enacted through the establishment of wooden casks industries by Nigerians. (NAI, DCI1/1/730/S:11 Minor Industries Enquiries, 1951-1958).

By October, 1953, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development also known as World Bank at the request of the colonial government sent a team to inspect the economic potentials of Nigeria in relation with industrial development while the report of the team was entitled "The Economic Development of Nigeria" (NAI, DCI1/1/730 Development of Minor Industries, 1944-1958). The findings of the team were tailored towards the expansion of industries which after detailed examination were comprehensively accepted by the colonial government without any reservation (NAI, DCI1/1/730 Development of Minor Industries, 1944-1958). The visit of the World Bank team to Nigeria further attests to the incorporation of the colonial economy into the structures and dictates of western capitalist system which was part of strategies of the British before the country's independence.

The practical demonstration of this acceptance could be seen in the way the Nigerian government enhanced the expansion of industries for possible reduction of importation of consumer and intermediate goods. (NAI, DCI1/1/730 Development of Minor Industries, 1944-1958). For instance, industries owned by indigenous and foreign investors in Kano were greatly expanded through the branch of D.C.I., in August, 1954. (Monthly Report for August 1954 on Industries in Kano NAI, DCI 1/1/730 Development of Minor Industries, 1944-1958). Some of the industries were, perfumes and cosmetics factory owned by Geka Trading Company Limited, Cannery factory established by Nig. Canning Co. Ltd., floor tile industries established by Bishara Stephen, rubber shoes factory established by K. Karoun& P. Raad, soap factory owned by J. Raad& G. Fadoul, Tyre retreading factory established by Odutola Tyre Soles Co. Ltd and Bone crushing industry owned by Caman El Tayeb. (Monthly Report for August 1954 on Industries in Kano (NAI, DCI 1/1/730 Development of Minor Industries, 1944-1958).

In the Southern part of the country, negotiations were concluded on the establishment of a cement factory at Nkalagu in the Eastern Region, with a projected output of 100,000 tons per annum and the venture was financed jointly by the Federal Government, the Eastern Regional Development Corporation and two expatriate companies which, between them, had long experience of the cement industry in all ramifications (NAI, DCI1/1/730 Development of Minor Industries, 1944-1958). The spatial distribution of these industries in the southern and northern parts of the country reveals the level of market potentials of the Nigerian economy with indigenous and foreign investors investing in different parts of the country without considering geographical and ethnic interests which ordinarily would have shaped the investment decision of the indigenous investors. The colonial government through its blue-print of expansion of industries continued to support, even after the report of the World Bank team, industries established in the regions through its affiliated offices of the Department of Commerce and Industries in the regions until the granting of greater autonomy to the regions in terms of governance on the 1st of October, 1954 (NAI, DCI1/1/730 Development of Minor Industries, 1944-1958). The granting of this greater autonomy in 1954 served as a follow up to the commencement of regionalism which started in 1951.

It is important to state that the expansion of industries which was tailored along import restriction was strategic. This strategy was hinged upon the need to deflate the financial commitments which emanated from the importation of some of goods that were hitherto imported outside the sterling areas. To the British, the financial commitments which accompanied the importation of these goods were enough to establish industries in their largest colony in Africa. Two reasons may have informed this decision. First, continuous importation of these goods outside the sterling areas in the estimation of the British was capable of empowering their industrial rivals economically in global economic space. Second, expansion of industries with the aim of import restriction was capable of positioning them as influential players of the post-independence economy of Nigeria ahead of other industrialised nations. This expansion was not designed to enable Nigeria compete with other nations globally. The expansion of industries in Nigeria was only necessitated by the need to keep pace with other phases of socio-economic developments of Nigeria.

This expansion did not obliterate completely the danger of being sickly, beggarly and underdeveloped (B.R. Salz, 1955: 3-4). This underdevelopment was deeply rooted in the inability of these industries to transmute from ordinary producing industries to higher productivity that was capable of lifting the Nigerian economy from poverty to relative affluence (A.O. Olaoye, 1986: 63 & Adam Smith, 1776:, W.W. Rostow, 1960). This lack of higher productivity denied the industries established under the policy framework of import control in colonial Nigeria the opportunity of attaining the height of manufacturing which in a sense, a higher stage of production. This lack of transition explains colonialism as a project initiated primarily to make Africa a centre of commodity production designed to meet the demands of metropolitan production as well as markets for European manufactured goods.

The interpretation of this could be seen in the way the colonial state in Nigeria adopted import control as a strategy of securing the Nigerian market for the comprehensive benefit of Britain. This is because the consumer goods produced by these industries were highly incapable of satisfying the demands of the Nigerian consumers hence the importation of goods from other parts of the globe became a necessity. The necessity of this importation favoured British export into Nigeria while the export profile of Nigeria became a production tool used in satisfying the needs of British export to Nigeria and other parts of the globe. This was done to the exclusion of other overseas industrial rivals. This lack of bureaucratic altruism prevented the industries established from metamorphosing into a state of producing machinery, equipment and other industrial goods which can be described as the stage of full industrialisation. This misinterpretation or misconception by scholars of industrialisation remains in the body of Nigeria's industrialisation historiography.

Conclusion

The end of the Second World War in 1945 led to the relaxation of extremely rigid wartime import policy. However, the relaxation did not open completely, the Nigerian economy for unregulated imports. The colonial state saw the importance of preparing its largest colonies in Africa for decolonisation through economic policy of import restrictions through the expansion of industries. However, the historical details of the colonial government's efforts at expanding industries after the war was not borne out of altruistic intentions of preparing the country for full industrialisation. Rather, it was more of response to global pressure on the European powers to decolonise their African territories. But one good scenario of the postwar import control in Nigeria was that the response of Britain at decolonising her largest African territory was the umbrella of protection offered to the indigenous investors in Nigeria in the postwar Nigerian economy. This was different from the wartime Nigerian economy where some of these investors were not given adequate protection needed to survive the wartime economic realities. It must also be added that the inability of the industries established in Nigeria during the period under study to produce heavy machinery and equipment meant that the tax incentives granted by the colonial state was recouped through import tariff of the imported equipment by these industries.

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