

# **Violent Conflicts and Challenges of Adjustment in Plateau State: Case Study of Jos North Local Government Area, Plateau State**

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## **Abstract**

Nigeria is confronted with numerous violent conflicts that have inflicted monumental damages on the economy and peaceful co-existence amongst groups. These conflicts assume ethnic and religious forms leading to depletion of human resources/displacement, weakened state apparatus, and increased threats of secession. A fact is that states with multiple ethnicity and religions are prone to violent conflicts. This becomes more pronounced with underlying indigenship/settlership debate. Conflicts in Plateau State are often deeply ethnic-based; religious factor has also remained a shadow trigger. The frequency of conflicts had led to trends of relocation, adjustment and even protracted conflicts in the deeply polarised state. This paper looks at structural adjustment as essential in the discussion of the pattern post conflict residency, settlement and human endeavour in Jos North LGA of Plateau State. It agrees with submissions of

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Richard Lazarus (1961) on theories of adjustment and personality; adopting a mixed design approach, while some KIIs were conducted as primary sources of data collection along secondary sources which were qualitatively analysed. Strengthening security and peace architecture including promotion of human security in prevention, rather than response to violence, will help in the healing process of the fragmented communities and people.

**Keywords:** Violent Conflicts, Indigenship, Settlership, Adjustment, and Community Polarisation.

### **Introduction**

Nigeria has been described as an entity forced together for purpose of easy administration by the British colonial power and not the peoples' will and interest. The British governed colonised Nigeria as separate but unified entity. While indirect rule was entrenched in the West, direct rule was administered in the North. Religion was used to further entrench a divide and-rule strategy with Christianity and Western education accepted in the South, and North populated by people of Islam faith. In corroboration, Agbaje (1990:288) submitted that "colonial administration underwrote Islam in the Northern part of colonial Nigeria and used it as the basis of political authority in local administration. It not only kept Christian missionaries from the North, so as to preserve the assumed Islamic homogeneity of the region, it also adopted the emirate system of political administration with its strong religious content."

Years after its independence, Nigeria continued to witness violent conflicts among the composite ethnic groups be it in majority or minority. Conflicts emanating from fear of dominance, identity, economic, political system, traditional structures' control, define the pattern and status of ethnic relevance. Major ethnics and numerous minority groups' aspiration for freedom from dominance and agitation for self-control led to states and Local Government Areas' (LGAs) creation. There is, however, continuous agitation for more states and Local Government Areas' creation as people of similar ethnicity, be it majority or minority, wish to be politically independent and free from dominant control of other ethnic groups. There have been several forms of hostilities among ethnic groups, and between

indigenous ethnic groups and settlers. Predominantly, conflict among indigenous groups is often attributed to land disputes, traditional stool control and dominance. Religion as a factor has not been so pronounced in the conflict between indigenous communities and settlers. Apparently, this is because most conflicts of such nature have been between certain indigenous groups (mostly Christian) and the largely Muslim Hausa/Fulanis.

The contentious issue of indigeneship and settlership in Nigeria undermined provisions of the Federal Character Principle regarding rights of any Nigerian to reside and develop in any part of the country, tribe or religion notwithstanding. Indigeneship and settlership have become major triggers of violent conflicts mostly executed along religious paths. This is more pronounced in multi-ethnic states of the North Central geo-political zone also known as the Middle Belt. In his submission Bagudu (2004) stated that “the zone accounts for up to 60% of Nigeria’s 374 ethnic groups. The Middle-Belt, therefore has more potential for conflicts than any other region in Nigerian.”

In reference to Plateau State, Kwaja (2014:8) noted that the state “is a host to over 60 different ethnic groups. Some of the indigenous tribes in the state include: Afizere, Amo, Anaguta, Angas, Aten, Berom, Bogghom, Buji, Challa, Chip, Fier, Gashish, Goemai, Irigwe, Jarawa, Jukun, Kwagalak, Kwalla, Meryang, Miango, Miship, Montol, Mushere, Mupum, Mwaghavul, Ngas, Piapung, Pyem, Ron-Kulere, Rukuba, Taletc, Taroh and Youm. Each ethnic group has its own distinct language with Berom, Langtang, Mwaghavul and Goemai as the 4 major dominant ethnic groups in Plateau State.” Therefore, Plateau State with its diverse indigenous Christian ethnic groups are “indigenes,” while the Muslim Hausa/Fulanis are considered “settlers.” Plateau State presents a scenario for potential violent conflicts caused by many factors but often prosecuted along religious and identity affiliation.

Alubo (2006:36) opined that “because of the sheer number of ethnic groups in the central region, identity conflicts and contestations over citizenship, land and shared natural resources are regular and fierce.” He maintained further that “since independence, the Middle Belt has been a scene of frequent flare ups. The Nigerian and international media describe the frequent clashes as religious, but in fact they stem from minority ethnic groups’ attempt to wrench themselves free from what they see as the

domination by the Hausa-Fulani establishment (pg. 38).

Plateau State is prone to violent conflicts emanating from identity struggle, political control, economic and fear of ethnic dominance. These violent conflicts are executed through ethnicity affiliation and religious sentiments. Ethnicity, identity and religion have propelled and sustained pattern and emergence of violent conflicts in Plateau State which has continued to affect the residency pattern, social interaction and communication. In agreement, Kaigama (2012:12) stated that, “the combined factors of wrong government policies, fear of domination, power tussles, poor response to security reports, politicisation of religion and ethnicity, poverty and religious hate have played roles in the crises.” These crises have various degrees of effects and consequences on the people.

Some effects are temporal while some are enduring; largely, these have affected mutual trust and cooperation among the people and underscore living and settlement pattern among the people in post violent conflict period.

Violent conflict induced settlement pattern is more challenging not only in the manner of colossal loss and human displacement but due to the attendant psychological effects; coupled with ineffective policies of government at rehabilitation, reintegration and reconstruction. While the polarised communities of Plateau State constantly remind one of the wounds of the past and potential for recurring violence, the situation has also affected peaceful co-habitation, mutual trust, human and societal development with huge government expenditure on peace building and conflict management. There are unrecorded businesses collapse, hasty families’ relocation and deep-seated animosity and vengeance in some victims, thus painting an atmosphere of *soft-peace*. A city that had played host to people within and outside the country is now in disarray. Community polarisation and current pattern of living occasioned by emergency adjustment to past violent conflicts has affected livelihoods and human development hugely. The need for stakeholders’ collaboration in an effort to salvage the Plateau becomes imperative.

#### **Ethno-Diversity, Ownership claim and Emergence of Jos (North) LGA**

Before Jos North was created in 1991, conflict had lasted in Jos city for decades. The emergence of Jos city as colonial settlement among many

indigenous ethnic groups aided by economic activities, rich natural and mineral resources and complimentary good weather, drew people within and outside Nigeria to Jos. Morrison (1976) commented that “Jos, is a colonial creation, set up by the tin miners who came to the Plateau soon after the imposition of indirect rule, and sustained by the missions who established their headquarters in the state.” Plotnicov (1967) and Freund (1981) stated further that “Jos has attracted migrants from all over Nigeria to work in the tin mines and related service industries.”

Danfulani (2002:244) contended that Jos crisis is as a result of “the polyglot nature of the city which resulted from the nineteenth century migrations of different ethnic groups to the area to work in the Tin mines.” Hence, Jos can be described as home to many people of various tribes, ethnics, religion and nationality. The largely Hausa-Fulani Muslims meet with the indigenous Christian dominant ethnic groups. It is however noteworthy that Christianity as a religion itself was introduced to Jos during the colonial rule. Bruce (1977) made it clear that “Christianity was brought into the Jos Plateau by European missionaries: the first mission station was established at Panyam in 1907, by the Sudan United Mission.” But today, it is a major defining factor in any approach to conflict management and peace building in the entire Plateau State.

The ownership claim to Jos by indigenous Nigerian ethnics however did not start today. According to Leonard (1972:3), “ethnic groups whose homelands are at a great distance from Jos particularly the Hausas, Ibo and Tiv- at different times, have tried to claim or control Jos, and to justify their political strategies they have employed alien religious ideologies or ‘modern’ political concepts that have nullified the traditional claim of native ownership and local ethnic hegemony.” Therefore, Jos as a city has experienced epochs of violent conflicts over its ownership and control from the 1960s. It is however apt to reiterate that violent conflict in Jos North has remained between the indigenous ethnic tribes and Hausa-Fulanis. This is not because there are no more other ethnic tribes in the state/city like Yorubas and Igbos. However, the claim of ownership had been fiercely contested between the indigenous ethnic groups and the Hausa-Fulanis because of the strong claim by the Hausa-Fulanis.

Today, the Yoruba ethnic group is mostly found in an area called *Angwa Rukuba*. They reside in this area irrespective of religious affiliation. Despite

history of violent conflicts and attempt at displacing them from this location by the Hausa-Fulani, the Yorubas are known to have restricted and fought back against assailants thus remaining in the area. Similarly, there is the angle of traditional political institution to the politics, interests and causes of conflicts in Jos North. These are expressed by chiefdoms, paramount rulership, districts and ward headship. The *Gbong Gwon* Jos is the paramount ruler and most significant traditional leader with seat of power in Jos. The Hausa/Fulani was said to have been producing the *Sarkin Jos* (King of Jos) since 1902 to 1947 when the last Sarki died. An injustice was said to have been made when Rwang Pam, a Berom, was made the Gbong Gwom Jos in 1947 and the Hausas relegated to *Magajin Gari* (Shedrack, 2007:26-27).

Traditional leaders are the custodian of customs and culture. They are institutions that have good control of the people and power to influence government's decisions and policies. Thus, when the late Gbong Gwon was interviewed in 2004 regarding the issues of indigenship and settlers in Jos and whether he believed that the Hausa would remain non-indigene, his submission gave insight into the position of the indigenous tribes and reasons why crises in the LGA has remained protracted. The late traditional rulers stated that "even if they have been here for 1000 years," the Gbong Gwom Jos replied, "you are absolutely right, that is what I am talking about... None of them is going to be given indigeneship here and that is the truth" (Tell, Lagos May 31, 2004).

Dariye (2002) in Shedrack (2007:20) summed that "the origin of Jos as an urban centre can be traced to the tin mining industry founded after the colonial interventions from 1902. Naraguta village, six kilometres North of Jos, was the first administrative headquarters of Jos. The capital was relocated from Naraguta to Jos in 1914, mainly because larger deposits of tin were discovered there and because there was more land and water in Jos. In 1915, the colonial administration granted Jos the status of a second class township." Thus, Jos has been a trade centre over a century ago. The signs and symbols of land extractions and mining could be found till date in the city. Shedrack noted further that:

Jos was divided into three main clusters; the first category was the Government Residential Area (GRA) where Europeans and other foreigners, as well as the cream of the

colonial elite settled. Second was the native town, which was inhabited by Hausa. Third was the township comprised of other Nigerians and foreigners. The division granted the incomers access to land in Jos and Hausa was the single largest group to have settled in the new city within the first forty years”

Dariye’s submission underscores the current claim by the Hausas to the ownership of Jos North. This was further buttressed by his conclusion that “these incomers contributed to the growth of the economy of the township in numerous ways. The Hausa, by their large number, inevitably led the way in the growth of Jos” (Shedrack, 2007:21). Development of Jos as city is also attributable to the Hausas. The paramount Hausa/Fulani leader in Jos, the Turakin Jos, Alhaji Inuwa Ali, in 2002 at a speech delivered by him at the Presidential Retreat on Peace and Conflict Resolution at National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies Kuru, Jos, 23-26 January, affirmed that “historically, Jos is a Hausa settlement and this had been confirmed by Mr. Ames, a colonial Administrator who gave the population of Jos town in 1950 as 10,207, out of which 10,000 people were of Hausa/Fulani origin. Before the arrival of the British, the present location of Jos was a virgin land and the situation as could be seen today shows no concentration of Beroms or any of the tribes in the neighborhood as being seen in the heartland of Jos town.”

New dimension to the violent conflict was from the creation of Jos North Local Government Area (LGA) from Jos city in 1991 which divided the city into Jos North and Jos South, where ethnic groups within Jos North LGA such as the Berom, Afizere, and Anaguta (indigenes) groups struggled for control of the new LGA. Situation became worse when the Hausa ethnic group claimed the LGA was created to meet the demands of the Hausa/Fulani to have their own political control since their population has grown over the years. The resultant struggle led to cacophony of violence which claimed thousands of lives and destroyed properties worth hundreds of millions of Naira.

Jos North is one of the three divides of Jos city, the capital of Plateau State with a population of 429,300 as at the 2006 census. Though considered to be one of the smallest LGAs, Jos North holds a substantial degree of

economic and political power of the state as host to higher institutions, government and private businesses, agencies, private and religious institutions and many more. Jos North is evenly inhabited by three *indigeneous* groups of Anaguta, Afizere and Beroms. There are *settlers* Fulani and Hausa, Yoruba community, Igbo community and other people from within and outside Nigeria residing and working in the area. The question around the ownership of Jos and Jos North LGA by extension has remained largely unanswered, seriously contested and one which governments at both LGA and state have clandestinely avoided due to its sensitivity.

#### **Violent Conflicts and Challenges of Adjustment in Jos North LGA**

Violent conflicts are not exclusive to Jos North nor the consequences thereof new occurrences. As noted by Leonard (1972), “the politically explosive nature of Jos has been recognised and commented on by many observers and certainly by the colonial administration, which periodically reported on the situation from 1920 onward.” While these conflicts are not new events however, it is noteworthy that effects of the violent conflicts in the past and present have determined the demography of the city.

Structural adjustment as occasioned by violent conflicts can be categorised under internal and external adjustment. Many victims of Jos North crises have deserted the state and returned to their home state having lost properties and families in the conflicts. This was common to some foreigners, Igbos and Yorubas. This is the pattern of external adjustment, where victims started life afresh in places away from Jos city. Many victims both indigenes and settlers have remained in the city picking up pieces of their lives as they start life afresh. Findings however did not show cases of any Hausa/Fulani leaving Jos city because of violent conflicts. The adjustment theory stipulates man’s reaction to survival. Hence, reactions of victims to surviving post-conflict periods will be examined in line of livelihoods accordingly.

Violent conflicts could be among the indigenous tribes, and between them and the settlers. The effects cover every tribes and individuals in the state/city however. Prominent among people who had suffered great loss, due to violent conflicts, are the Igbos whose businesses have been truncated by the conflicts. Some lost lives as a result while some till date are unable

to rise from the ruins of the crises. Like the Igbos, the Yorubas have also suffered significant loss in several attempts at displacing them from their strong hold. In Jos North, Yorubas (mostly from Ogbomoso town in Oyo State) occupied the area called Angwa Rukuba up to Tina Junction. The area leads straight to Bauchi Ring Road which is populated by the Hausa/Fulanis. The proximity has made incursion during violent conflicts possible as the two parties engaged in fierce fight. However, the Yorubas have remained in the area and entertain no accommodation for the Hausa/Fulanis.

One major adjustment effect of the violent conflicts and communal clashes in Jos North is the sharp division among the ethnic groups and polarised communities. In Jos North Local Government Area, people live in most areas along ethnic and religion paths. It is a major psychological result which has manifested in culture of fear and mutual suspicion among the groups within the Local Government Area. There are communities predominantly occupied by Muslims; some of these include Angwan Rogo, Bauchi Road and Angwa Rimi. These areas are avoided by Christians of any tribe at any point in time for imaginary fear of attack. There is palpable tension every Fridays as the Hausa Fulanis engage in the *Jumat* service. The tension is always feasible in the flagrant closure of major high and intra-city roads for their prayers. Thus, moments before, during and after the prayer sessions often remain tense as non-Muslim and other road users try as much not to incur the wrath of the Muslim faithful. Equally, areas such as Jenta Adamu, Angwan Rukuba, Hwolshe, Rock Haven and Eto Baba are mostly populated by the Christians while the Muslims also avoid these areas.

There are some areas that are evenly populated by Igbos, Yorubas and indigenous Plateau tribes. These include Angwa Jarawa, Busa-Buji, Alheri among others. Other ethnic tribes from outside Plateau State reside in these communities based on their religion and ethnic affiliations. It is not uncommon to see a Christian Yoruba in Tudun-Wada and a Muslim Yoruba in Rikkos. However, history had it that non-Hausa Muslims in some of the Hausa-controlled communities have been attacked by the Hausa Muslims during crises such as the 2010 Jos crisis. The 2010 Jos crisis was pursued along religious lines. Many Christians in Muslim dominated areas were massacred and same with Muslims in Christian populated areas. After the crisis, which polarised communities in the city, landed properties such as residential

buildings and businesses were exchanged in mutual agreement between some Muslims and Christians who hitherto had been living in areas populated by people of different faiths. People who hitherto were landlords were forced to live in rented and smaller apartments while their original houses dilapidate, or are occupied by strangers of different faiths or totally abandoned. Natural code has become entrenched in an unwritten constitution which defines the pattern of habitation.

The main campus of the University of Jos is located along the Bauchi road. Many of the students were said to have been attacked and killed in past crises. This has its effect on student cohesion and integration in the Federal-owned University. As noted by Shedrack (2007:78), “non-Muslim students of the University of Jos will hardly accept accommodation in Angwa Rogo, despite its proximity to the University of Jos. They have refused to be persuaded by appeals from members of the Angwa Rogo community to return to the area.” Instructively, this has economic implication on the area as many commercial residential buildings are left unoccupied.

It is evident that the polarisation of communities in Jos North Local Government Area is also a factor that has perpetuated conflict in the area.

It also informs the perceived intensity and duration of conflict. For instance, after the 2010 crisis, scores of Muslim faithfuls were said to have been killed when they attempted to perform prayers after the Ramadan fasting in the Rock Haven area where their praying ground was located. Rock Haven is currently dominated by Christians who have become uncomfortable and resisted the use of the allotted area as Muslims’ praying ground. New comers into Jos city quickly follow the line of ethnicity and or religion in their choice of residency and businesses. Thus, rather than healing, polarisation has continued to remind residents of the ugly past, caution for present day and preparation for eventual outbreak of violent conflict.

Similarly, the economic effect of the protracted violent conflict on Jos North and the people is very high. Since people live along ethnic paths, some markets and stalls are opened along same pattern. It is a common thing to identify Hausa-Muslim controlled portion in major markets. Although these markets are patronised by people of other tribes and religions, there is always palpable fear during such visit and market interactions. It is known that some dominant Hausa markets such as the ‘*katako market*’ in Katak and ‘*tomato market*’ along Bauchi Ring Road are patronise by everyone

irrespective of tribe, culture and religion. In the centre of these markets, established along major roads are military checkpoints and personnel who have been stationed to quickly respond to any issues that could degenerate into violence.

While this is a continuous observation with its attendant remote and direct effects, the destruction of the ultra-modern market in the centre of Jos, popularly called *terminus* market, which was more of a unification factor as it contained people of diverse tribes and religions, has been described as devastating on the economy of the people. Not only were shops and properties destroyed, new shops along the popular terminus market are said to be costly and out of reach of common traders. Findings revealed that most of these shops are occupied by Igbo traders while Muslims traders that could not afford shops, hawk in wheelbarrow, operate open road-side shops or sell from their cars. The May 2014 twin bomb blasts in the *terminus* market which killed over 100 people and left many injured has made the State Government restricted street and open-shop trading. In the recent time however and amidst government restrictions, street trading has returned to some of the major streets of the *terminus* market but are quickly disassembled when government agencies are sited. Violent conflicts in Jos North have not only affected the pattern of living, trading and interaction, but also affected social activities and engagement. It has psychological and traumatic impacts that have not been attended to. Kwaja (2014:20) noted that:

women, children and other vulnerable groups have been at the receiving end of the consequences of violent conflicts in Jos North. They have been confronted by series of conflict-induced challenges such as forced displacements, poor healthcare and health related complications, rape, physical assault and psychological abuse. Coupled with these challenges, they continue to face several obstacles in terms of the extent to which they are mainstreamed in conflict management and peace building.

Before violence eruption, women were involved in a lot of commercial or business activities in order to support their families. Such businesses include trading in goods, knitting, storage of grains for sales and farming. However, violence has destabilised the structure of households and this greatly affected women and destroyed their livelihoods. Shedrack (2008)

reacted that women were particularly affected by conflict in some ways. One, death of family members including husbands and children; two, unemployment; three, internal displacement; four, theft and loss of property. Furthermore, many of women were displaced physically and psychologically. Physical displacement created severe food crisis and also a massive breakdown of the economy leading to extreme poverty. While, psychological displacement created a scenario where women behaved mad because their children and husbands were killed in front of them. There are men who suffered job and property loss as well. The psychological effect of inability to cater for family as bread winner cannot be undermined.

The current day pattern of living in Jos North LGA does not reflect the wishes of people but a reflection of what violence has forced on them. Immediately after the crises in 2010, the only known people that continued to trade without fear or favour are the *Miango women* who hawk yam around communities irrespective of ethnic or religious dominance. It was also common to see men from other ethnic groups and religions engaging in businesses hitherto exclusive to Muslim men. Such trades include tea and bread selling (*mai-sayi*), *suya* and *roasted chicken* trade. Poor interaction therefore had its toll on economic well-being and livelihood of the people. Some displaced people in Jos North have also moved to other LGAs where they have struggled to establish themselves. The submission of Adam (2013) on this issue is that:

most of the Hausa/Kanuri population in the rural and semi rural areas of the Jos Plateau, and a substantial number of Fulani agro-pastoralists, were driven out in January 2010. Subsequently the Fulani regrouped in parts of Barakin Ladi and Riyom, and it is in these areas that the conflict has become protracted. The Nigerian Federal Government imposed a 'state of emergency' in Barakin Ladi, Riyom and Jos South, in addition to Jos North (which includes the central part of metropolitan Jos), on 31 December 2011.'

Violent conflicts leading to human adjustment indicated in living pattern, came with the desire for survival by the victims. This has consequential effects on inter-relations and co-habitation with host communities thereby birthing further conflicts emanating from use and access to shared natural

resources like water and land. Shedrack, (2007) noted that, “ethno-religious crises and attendant escalations have contributed to large scale loss of lives and properties, including attendant society polarisation thereby undermining human and social security in the State.” Unlike in more rural areas where families displaced can easily move inward and acquire new land for building and farming, displacement has forced a more complex structural adjustment pattern on victims of Jos North crises, being an urban area with stiff competition over limited resources. Accordingly, many families have become separated as means of livelihood have been affected, many young boys and girls engage in social vices to survive while security reports attested to increase in illicit drug use and abuse, petty-trading, cult clashes, armed robbery, gangsterism and other associated crimes that could be linked to broken family values and lacking parental care.

### **Stakeholders’ Collaboration and Management of Violent Conflicts in Jos**

Violent conflict is not new to Jos but managing the conflicts since the colonial era has been challenging. The challenges are not about understanding the conflict dynamics, but inability to implement peacebuilding recommendations. Government observed such implementation could lead to another round of violent conflicts. Thus, Plateau State government rather than resolving issues that trigger conflicts in Jos North, have decided to manage same. This created a condition of grave-yard peace in the city.

Responses of successive administrations to managing and mitigating violent conflicts have been heavily criticised as inadequate and ineffective (Madunagu, 2011:89; Kwaja, 2014:13; Shedrack:2007:81-90). Government has failed to address critical factors that triggered violent conflicts such as ownership and control of Jos North LGA political seat. It has failed to implement epochs of recommendations by constituted commissions of inquiries regarding causes of violent conflicts. There is large breakdown of trust between the populace and security agencies/government which are perceived as incapable and bias. In a city where local security outfits outnumbered the regular security operatives and where communities remained polarised, there are inherent vulnerability as people continue to live with suspicion.

Efforts of state and non-state actors, including international development

partners at restoring enduring peace in Plateau State cannot be over emphasised. Plateau State has many local Civil Society Organisations that are implementing donor-funded peace building projects across the state. There are also some international organisations working in the state. These organisations are making strategic in-roads into de-polarising communities across the state, restoring mutual understanding among the people, building religious tolerance and ensuring proper rehabilitation processes for victims of violent conflicts through trauma counselling, small scale empowerment, agricultural intervention, women empowerment, and ending of violence against women and children, etc.

Plateau State Government recently established, in 2016, an agency in response to security management and peace building needs in Plateau State. The Director General of the Peace Building Agency, Joseph Lengman (2017) asserted that “quite a number of issues that have resulted or caused conflicts in the past are still in the society, so it beholds on this agency to work with non-state actors in preventing conflicts eruption and promote peace across the state. So, the agency exists to prevent conflicts, manage conflicts and help in the resettlement and reintegration from the old conflicts.”

The importance of stakeholders’ collaboration in strategic engagement towards restoring peace in Jos is critical as no individual or structure can achieve this. Security operatives like the *operation safe haven* and *operation Rainbow* have not been able to achieve much success thereby suggesting that civil-military relationship is important. As commonly said within Jos, “the day a Christian youth visits a Muslim friend and sleeps over at his place without being harassed or killed, that is the day true peace returns to Jos.”

The framework for stakeholders’ engagement should therefore be strengthened towards attaining holistic peace from the current grave-yard peace scenario. Joseph Lengman summed this up in his submission about the Peace Building agency that: “the agency is to work with non-state actors to mitigate or reduce risks of violent conflicts in the state. The mandates and functions of the agency will be achieved working with multi stakeholders including the security agencies, CSOs, INGOs, NGOs and relevant community stakeholders.”

## **Conclusion and Recommendations**

As opined by Richard (1961), “adjustment is conceived as continually occurring in response to internal pressures and environmental demands, but special problems are created for the person when these demands become excessive; when an individual is exposed to conditions of stress.” This situation is more pronounced in a conflict protracted area like Jos North, where pressures and demands have made residents react to conflict scenario with two intents of survival and living. Survival in the sense of safety and living in the light of livelihood.

Human adjustment challenges in Jos North are because of violent conflicts. The ownership contention of Jos city from colonial administration and misconception surrounding the creation of Jos North LGA are the underlining enduring factors that have sustained violence leading to human displacement and follow up adjustment. The violence has not only affected human cohesion in the LGA but reminder of past conflicts and inability of government and other stakeholders to address them.

Residents of Jos North LGA (indigenes and settlers) continue to live along the patterns of ethnicity and religious affiliation. Ironically, people and families relocate out of Jos North daily even as some move in to settle in the area. They adjust tactically to external factors that may undermine their safety, well-being and cohesion. These aggressive responses at times, undermine provisions of the law. In reality, good number of residents have become more vulnerable due to new settlement patterns as they are unable to access good health services, quality education, social justice and basic amenities such as good roads, pipe-borne water, etc. These submissions corroborate Taylor, (1983) who argued that “the adjustment process centres around three themes: A search for meaning in the experience, an attempt to regain mastery over the event in particular and over life more generally, and an effort to restore self-esteem through self-enhancing evaluations.” Hence, Jos North remained an area where people continually react to violent occurrence in the manner at which safety is guaranteed while practically making efforts at rebuilding their lives.

As the Plateau State Government makes efforts at peace building, restoration and transformation, it is critical to address those factors that triggered and have perpetuated violent conflicts in the city. There is the need for conscious efforts at re-building government-public trusts in response to and prevention of violent conflicts. Rehabilitation, reconstruction and

reintegration plan of the government should address victims of violent conflicts irrespective of ethnicity, tribes or religion. The need for state and non-state actors' collaboration cannot be over emphasised. Military response to mitigating conflicts have failed woefully. Strategic effort should be made and directed towards reorientation and sensitisation, mutual beneficiary projects and initiatives that will break the imaginary borders and walls between the Christians and Muslims, albeit the indigene, Yorubas, Igbos and Hausas/Fulanis.

Policies of the government have remained ineffective not because of its non-suitability and design but largely due to practicability and adaptability. Should the government policies be effective, there is need for holistic consideration of elements that have disintegrated and polarised communities across the state. The need for diverse attention to focus and takes care of the need of everyone, especially the vulnerable groups directly or indirectly affected by crises is essential. Collaborative stakeholdership will enhance robust discussions and dialogue that will enable well-meaning and far reaching decisions that will be seen to all as fair and equitable. If community and personal security of citizens are guaranteed, it is expected that economic, food, health, environmental and political securities will be easily achieved. Knowing that as a conflict ravaged state, many people especially women that suffer dislocation in the state/city are products of violent conflicts, hence, peace building efforts should consider the needs, aspirations and position of this set of people. Personal safety and protection from all forms of violence are crucial. How has conflicts affected them; is affecting them and will possibly continue to affect them. These are very critical considerations toward building a society that guarantees human security and value participatory development away from needless structural adjustment induced by violent conflicts. Hence, government should ensure that it addresses the physical and non-physical effects of violent conflicts. People should be compensated for property loss, people should be encouraged to mix together and interact with one another, religious tolerance and understanding should be preached, aggrieved members of the society should be pacified, and fair justice should be served to ensure perpetrators of violence, however minimal, are cautioned. This will not only serve as deterrence measure but will make people see government and stakeholders' intervention as unbiased and objective. The *Berlin wall* occasioned by

displacement and human adjustment to post conflict situation can be broken, however, government collaboration with other non-state actors must be holistic and inclusive in addressing root causes of violent conflicts while recommendations from dialogue and discussion sessions must be implemented as agreed by all.

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