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Assessing the Impact of Boko Haram's Terrorist Activities in the North East Region of Nigeria

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Abstract

This paper examined the impact Boko Haram in Northeast with special reference to the Lake Chad Basin (LCB). It will focus on the growing climate of insecurity in the region owing to the emergence of terrorism across the country particularly in the Northeast geopolitical zone. The analytical foundations was built upon the meaning of security, insecurity, tensions in the Northeast making reference to (LCB), the impacts on socio-political and economic relations among the occupants of the region such as high rate of death, unemployment, poverty as well as malnutrition in the North East Nigeria. It will proceed to the causes and the sustaining factors driving the insecurity in the region, the difficulties and failure facing Nigerian government to eliminate the Boko-Haram. The work uses secondary sources of data collection such as journal articles, newspaper, magazine, internet materials, books and others. This paper applied social identity and structural functionalism theories to better explain and analyze factors that aided the terrorist group. The paper discovered that the reason for the continuous attack of the Northeast region by the Bokoharam sect includes religious indoctrination, existence of porous border etc. the paper recommend that government should provide adequate border security and that there should be a campaign for the de orientation of religious radicalism in the region.

Keywords: Security, Insecurity, Counter-Insurgency, Terrorism, Government

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Introduction

Nigeria lies between latitudes 4° and 14°N and longitudes 2° and 15°E. Nigeria is attributed to possessing a total area of 923,768 km² (356,669 sq mi), making it the world's 32nd-largest country. It shares a 4,047 kilometres (2,515 mi) border with Benin (773 km), Niger (1497 km), Chad (87 km), and Cameroon (1690 km), and has a coastline of at least 853 km (Babalola, 2015). Nigeria is a complex society with a rapidly growing population of roughly 200million citizens. The country has around 500 different languages and over 250 distinct ethnic groups. (CIA world fact book 2021) Thus, uniting these complex groups into one unified political entity since the amalgamation of the country in 1914 proved difficult. Nigeria used to be one of the most secure and peaceful nations in the sub-region of West Africa, but in contemporary times has been plunged into waves of kidnapping, terrorism, and other heinous crimes such as armed robbery, banditry and most horrendously hosting one of the most dreaded terrorist group Boko Haram in the northeastern part of the country. The insecurity phenomenon in Nigeria's socio-political space has escalated and led to numerous losses of lives, which also has crippled socio-economic activities and a threat to public life and safety in the country (Yusuf & Abdullahi, 2020).

Although the phenomenon of militants is not new in Nigeria's political space, the history of post-independent Nigeria is replete with cases of militarized groups threatening the very existence of the Nigerian state. But of all the militant groups that have sprung up in Nigeria, non-have metamorphose into a terrorist group. Boko Haram, ravaging the northeast geopolitical zone of the country remains the most enigmatic in terms of *raison d'être*, the most violent in terms of *modus operandi*, and their destructive nature have differentiated them from militancy. It is arguably second to none in terms of brutality, savagery, wanton destruction, callousness, and its scope of operation (Olaniyan & Asuelime, 2014). Boko Haram, the Islamist group has displaced over 2.2 million people and killed more than 20,000 people in Northern Nigeria (Yusuf & Abdullahi, 2020; Àrendàs, 2016).

Since the Civil War of 1967–1970, the Boko haram group has presented the most frontal attack on the Nigerian state as a corporate entity, particularly concerning the long march toward the unity and peaceful coexistence of its disparate nationalities. And quite unlike its precursors, who had clear-cut demands, a base, and a driving philosophy, Boko Haram has been described as a group with "no headquarters, no known place of doing business, no central leadership or authority; working, instead, like a decentralized franchise operation" (Fabiyyi, 2013) anchored on religious driven sentiments to unleash mayhem on the people. The Nigerian state has experienced a surge in terrorist violence instigated by the sectarian group known as Boko Haram. Several analysts have advanced the view that

religious indoctrination, poverty, longstanding economic disparities within Nigeria, and structural violence, are key factors underlying the crisis in the Northeast. Adesoji, 2020, Walker, 2021, opined that the complex nature of the situation in Nigeria has at the same time caused some observers to characterize Boko Haram's aggression as violent extremism beyond a domestic agenda. The group's use of suicide attacks particularly presents a dreadful trait typical of international terrorist violence; a style of brutality hitherto alien to the Nigerian state. Nevertheless, Boko Haram has been able to draw upon a considerable base of local sympathy and support largely from the ranks of uneducated, unemployed, and impoverished youths in northern Nigeria. In addition, the group's ability to maneuver and stage-manage the force of religion in achieving its objectives appears to be dangerously reinforced by the influence of political interests and elites.

The socio-political culture of the region is mired in terms of instability which is glaring and nurtured through neo-patrimonialism or patronage politics. Since 2009, the region has been experiencing a deadly insurgency led by Boko Haram (BH), after the extrajudicial killing of its leader Muhammad Yusuf by the police (Àrendàs, 2016). In March 2015, the group pledged allegiance to the so-called Islamic State (IS) and now, the group calls itself "Islamic State's West African Province" or "Islamic State's Wilayat Gharb Afriqiyya" (ISWAP). However, the group is still referred to as "Boko Haram". The group is responsible for the deaths of over 15,525 civilians between May 2011 and May 2016 (Nigeria Security Tracker, 2016). Furthermore, BH has overtaken the IS as the world's deadliest organization. The insurgency has internally displaced over 2.2 million people, according to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (Foucher, 2016; Buchanan, 2015; BBC News, 2015).

This paper aims to contribute to the growing literature on the rise of impact of BH in the northeastern geopolitical zone of Nigeria. The next section provides the conceptual clarifications of security and insecurity with special reference to the Lake Chad region. Section three presents the theoretical underpinning of the study. Section four explains the methodological approach adopted in the study. Section five presents the causes of insurgency and insecurity in northeast Nigeria, provides insight into sponsors of insurgency activities in the Lake Chad region, and evaluates the factors sustaining the conflicts in the region. Finally, the concluding section highlights some recommendations.

The nature and Concept of Security and Insecurity

Security means safety to the average street man or woman or protection from harm and risk. It is state of sound mind against fear and total trust on internal state structure by the citizens to harness her mineral without limitations. According to Granville, (2020); Marc, Mogaka, & Verjee, (2015). Security is a core area of focus in the internal and external development of states' affairs. That is for any sovereign nation to boast of socio-political

and economic development, the internal security must be paramount area of interest such as safety in all ramification of the state. Imobighe (2001) argued that it will be difficult for individuals within a State to participate in productive activities without security. Correspondingly, without security, the state is bound to witness great difficulty in connecting its human development and the promotion of the general well-being of the people.

Insecurity is the opposite of security. Insecurity like security is often used in several ways. Many people would take it to mean a lack of safety or the existence of danger; hazard; uncertainty; lack of trust; doubtful; inadequately guarded or protected; lack of stability; disturbed; lack of protection and an unsafe environment (Achumba et al, 2013). Insecurity will make you lose trust, frightened, unsettled, oppressed, lose focus, and be devastated and lose your humanity. Hence any government who cannot provide security for her people has not measure the true meaning of democracy. Ajodo-Adebanjoko & Walter (2014) opined that insecurity is the state of being subject in every respect to terror, threat, risk, molestation, bullying, harassment, etc. Insecurity, for example, can be conceived as a threat to the state that often accounted for the arms and nuclear weapons race to protect the state.

Lake Chad Basin Region and Insecurity in the Northeast Nigeria

The socio-political and economic imbalance associated with various conflicts emanating from the Boko-Harm attacks ravaging the internal affairs in North East Nigeria cannot be separated from the porous border movement between the North East border and the Lake Chad Basin (LCB). The (LCB) situated is in West Africa which have a large-scale of Inland with complex visibility. This area formally protracted humanitarian services. According to Saheed (2020) stated that (LCB) was one of the sixth largest in the world with an Inland water and open area of 25,00 km² in the 1960s". It was void of any form of crisis and was structurally accounted for recreational purposes flourishing for various kinds of business and presenting opportunities for the Lake's livelihood such as agriculture, tourism, fishing, access to trade and others. But recently Boko-haram insurgents and other terror groups have occupy parts of the LBC which mostly affect the northeast part of nigeria Cecilia (2019) stated that "the (LCD) before now was one of the beauties found in West Africa that promote trade and commerce, tourism and source of income to the host countries".

The Boko-Haram had taken a monstrous proportion of the environment and spread across the border to Northeast Nigeria and settle in the Sambisa forest with sophisticated weapons in their possession. Subsequently, the insurgence migrating to the Northeast from the Lake Chad Basin to unleash havoc in the environment and migrate back, thus using the (LCD) and Sambisa forest as a meeting point. It's certain that the illegal process is

easily carried out because of the easy accessibility through the open border. This illegal migration had technically impaired and made it difficult for Nigeria's intelligent officers to investigate and hold Boko-Haram accountable because of their invisibility in the country.

The focus of this paper is to examine the recent situations in terms of Boko-Haram illegal activities in Northeast Nigeria, the impacts in the environment and the driving force of the extremist. The vulnerability of the Lake Chad Basin that are infiltrating terror groups' compounds with its terrain are mutually reinforcing factor in combination with the internal forces in the Sambisa forest in Nigeria and its environment. The relevant authority should reevaluate the use of the border from Chad, Niger, Cameroon, and others parts of the world. Globalization Principles as outlined in the Fundamentally International law is for every state to maintain; "Non-Interference in the Internal Fairs of other States (NIIFS)". But, it is sad that the government of Nigeria, refusal to apply the true principles of the rule of law to internal and external affairs to stop the illegal migration purring across the border is worried some. President Buhari ordered restrictions on the importation of food especially "Rice" but not affected by human movement at the borders. This had technically uplifted the idea of smuggling activities and the confidence of the Boko-Haram to ravage the NE region because of freedom of movement. Graham (2018) stated that "the land borders should be permanently closed to monitor and prevent corrupt individuals from leaving and coming into the country. And this can also keep in check or curtail smuggling activities from the LCB. Jibrin (2021) opined that "since 2009, the devastating conflicts in NE Nigeria have resulted in the deaths of approximately 35,000 people as a direct consequence of the insurgency". This number of death is related to the poor outcome of government response and uncoordinated relations from various agencies, stakeholders and actors, military personnel, police and government officials both local and international systems who compromise when it comes to the issues of insecurity in the NE Nigeria. Jibrin continues his assertion that Buhari visited Chad and other parts of the world concerning insecurity situations in Nigeria and his continuous repeating statement that "Boko-Haram had been degraded in the Northeast and no longer hold any significant territory" meaning he had lost the caliphate he thought he had established. Zabadi (2001), argued back then that, "unless one can be assured of his physical security or safety everything else will be meaningless, for those who die out of insecurity, it's good night, nothing to worry about any longer, but there is God". The United States maintained that the failure of Nigeria's government to gallantly uphold and defend her citizens against BH, is nor stand firm in strategizing on counter-terrorism to protect her citizens is an act against the principles of international law.

Theoretical Framework

This paper adopts the social identity theory to unravel the reason for the persistence of the BH attack in the Northeast region. The role of identity is a potentially important but overlooked aspect of conflicts and terrorism in the world. Yet, studies on homegrown terrorism and radicalization show that identity is an important element in the process (Al Raffie 2013). At the outset, it is critical to clarify the meaning of identity and how it is understood in this study. In his study of the impact of religion on identity in northern Nigeria, Blanco-Mancilla (2003:1) defines identity as ‘an collective of “subject positions,” e.g. “Muslim Hausa,” “Christian Female,” “northern Nigerian;” each representing the individual’s identification with a particular group, such as ethnicity, religion, gender.’ This definition captures the way people view themselves in Nigeria, where identity is defined by affiliation to ethno-religious groups rather than the national state (Agbibo and Okem, 2011).

In Nigeria, for example, it is erroneously assumed by many that a Hausa man, by virtue of his ethnicity, is a Muslim – a classification that distorts the Hausa-Fulani dichotomy in that region (Agbibo 2012). In a similar vein, Ikelegbe (2005) argues that most southerners are seen as Igbos thereby submerging numerous other minority ethnic groups such as the Ibibios, Efiks, Ijaws, and many others. In this study, identity is understood as ‘a combination of socio-cultural characteristics which individuals share, or are presumed to share, with others on the basis of which one group may be distinguished from others’ (Alubo, 2009). Ikelegbe (2005) identifies identity as a ‘subsisting sense of belonging and attachment to a group or institution, or such other social, cultural and political entities.’ Going by this definition, ‘identity’ acquires meaning when it is used as the only platform for the articulation of common interests or the pursuits of shared beliefs and culture (Agbibo and Okem, 2011).

The Social Identity Theory (SIT) provides valuable insights into understanding the combustible issue of religious identity in a pluralist country like Nigeria. The SIT ‘emphasizes the significance of the subject’s social situation, the group member’s internally constructed social identity, and the context in which a cohesive group consciousness is installed in the minds and hearts of the members’ (Arena and Arrigo, 2006). The SIT was first systematically developed by Tajfel and Turner (1985) and used to explain the psychological basis of intergroup discrimination. This perspective purports that membership to social groups forms an essential aspect of a person’s identity; indeed, ‘people tend to classify themselves and others into various social categories, such as organisational membership, religious affiliations, gender, and age cohort’ (Tajfel and Turner 1985). A social category gives the member a structure of self-reference, thus an identity. According to Tajfel and Turner (1985: 7), the group is ‘a collection of individuals who perceive themselves to be members of the same social category, share some

emotional involvement in this common goal, to achieve some degree of social consensus about the evaluation of their group and membership of it.' Seul (1999) defines group identity as 'members' shared conception of its enduring characteristics and basic values, its strengths and weaknesses, its hopes and fears, its reputation and conditions of existence, its institutions and traditions, its past history, current purposes, and future prospects. The SIT asserts that a person has not one 'personal self' but rather several selves that correspond to widening circles of group membership.

Different social contexts may trigger an individual to think, feel and act on the basis of his personal, familial or national 'levels of self' (Turner, 1982). In sum, the SIT states that (1) social identification is a perception of oneness with a group of person; (2) social identification involves the forming of in-groups and out-groups; and (3) social identification leads to activities that are congruent with the identity, support for institutions that embody the identity, stereotypical perceptions of self and others, and outcomes that traditionally are associated with group formation, and it reinforces the antecedents of identification (Agbibo, 2013), in her work entitled *Social Identity and Conflict*, Korostelina (2007) describes SIT as a "feeling of belonging to a social group, as a strong connection with social category, and as an important part of our mind that affects our social perceptions and behaviour". applying this definition to the Boko Haram Islamist movement which has a group identity that includes shared experiences, attitudes, beliefs and interests of in-group members, and is described through the achievement of a collectively professed aim to rid Nigeria of its corrupt and abusive government and institute what it describes as religious purity (Agbibo 2013), which the group tends to actualize by Islamizing the country or particularly the northern region.

Methodology

This paper employed the qualitative research methodology, Secondary source of data collection was employed for this paper, data was collected from textbook journals and extract of interviews granted by repentant BH member's newspapers etc.

Causes of Insurgency and Insecurity in the Northeast Nigeria

The Porosity of the Nation's Border

Nigeria's level of insecurity is associated with the high level of the country's porous borders, where people movements are largely untracked. As a result of the porous borders, it has witnessed an uncontrolled infusion of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) into the country which has enabled militancy and criminality in Nigeria. According to Edeko (2011), Nigeria is home to over 70% of the approximately 8 million illegal weapons that have been utilized to cause security problem in the country.

Leadership and Governance Crisis in Nigeria

From the past to the present, Nigeria's primary source of insecurity has been leadership and governance issue. The essential responsibility of any government, regardless of location, is to provide basic services such as water, power, a good road network, high-quality education, and general infrastructure. Ironically, these essential necessities are lacking in Nigeria, and the people are frustrated and disheartened as a result. Demoralization and rage, on the other hand, naturally provide fertile ground for aggressiveness and general insecurity. The scarcity of these essential facilities in Nigeria is embarrassingly attributable to corruption at the top levels of the political structure, rather than a lack of finances. A reality defined by Hazen and Horner (2007) of an affluent country with a majority of underprivileged people. Given the current state of democratic political system in which Nigeria is practicing, taking responsibility for providing leadership direction in such communities or societies in a multi-ethnic and religious culture like Nigeria is a huge task. To this end, it is possible that believing that poor leadership has increased to the uncertainty and causes of insecurity not only in the north but also in Nigeria as a whole is not an unfounded assertion.

Marginalization and Inequalities in the Country

Nigeria's present government has been accused of ethnic discrimination and marginalization of some parts of the country in the provision of basic infrastructure, all of which have exacerbated Nigeria's security concerns (Nwadiakor, 2011). Currently, those of Northern ancestry have been awarded major governmental positions, while the South-East has been left out in the cold. That could explain the agitation for the Biafra Republic and the Islamic Movement of Nigeria (IMN), as well as other security breaches that followed the movement. Furthermore, it is undeniable that Nigeria's life prospects are quite dissimilar. A large majority of the population feels deprived, oppressed, and marginalized, which has led to unhappiness and a loss of hope, particularly among the youth. Such young people are now using every legal or criminal means at their disposal to express their dissatisfaction with the current condition of affairs. As a result, there is an increased uncertainty in socio-political life of the people (Onuoha, 2011).

Impact Assessment of Insecurity in the Northeast Nigeria.

The degree of impacts of insecurity in the region of the North East Nigeria cannot be over emphasized in terms of loss of lives and properties through continuous attacks from the Boko-Haram Extremist.

The Humanitarian Effects of Insurgency Activities

The humanitarian implications in Nigeria are severe enough to put the country's very existence in jeopardy. When 11,000 to 30,000 people are slain, the killings are likely to be considered genocide, especially if the deaths are motivated by religion or ideology.

Nigeria's terror war has escalated to the point where it poses a serious threat to the community's health, security, and safety. The community's fundamental requirements are not supplied as a result of these attacks. Food, water, shelter, and medical treatment are all in short supply. Large-scale violence has resulted in a large number of deaths and internal displacements. The economy is in shambles, and society is in ruins. Large-scale humanitarian help is urgently needed at this time, but relief workers are not always safe (Fisseha, 2016). There has been a mass migration of civilians. According to estimates, the number of internally displaced individuals in the Northeast is as high as 1.5 million, with a total of 3 million, (Fisseha, 2016).

Inadequate Health Care Service Delivery and Facilities

The wellbeing of the populace is crucial and vital to a nation's existence. The Lake Chad basin region has witnessed a significant number of casualties and fatalities as a result of the insecurity brought on by the Boko Haram insurgency. According to the World Health Organization (WHO) Report on Violence and Health, which was released on October 3rd, 2002, more than a million people die and many more suffer non-fatal injuries each year as a result of various forms of violence. Millions of people have been injured and many lives have been lost as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency. As the number of injured people rises, medical facilities and hospitals are becoming overcrowded, putting undue strain on equipment and forcing medical staff to put in extra hours (Amalu, 2015).

Displacement of People and Shelter Crisis

Shelter which is a basic necessity of the human life is abruptly tampered with and in short supply in the Lake Chad region as a result of insecurity. It is impossible to estimate the total number of homes destroyed by the Boko Haram conflict. Millions of individuals have been forced to relocate because to this catastrophe. Over 2.1 million people were uprooted from their homes in Nigeria as a result of the Boko Haram insurgency (International Organization on Migration, 2015).

The Factors driving the Sustainability of Conflicts in Northeast Nigeria

Exploitation, Ethnicity and Religious Differences

It's important to remember that Nigeria's broad ethnic makeup is not always a source of instability; rather, political and religious leaders across the country frequently exploit ethnic feelings to further their own selfish goals and objectives. The elites utilize people's minds in this way to sow distrust and hatred among different ethnic groups and among the country's major religions, contributing greatly to Nigeria's insecurity challenges. In a multi-ethnic country like Nigeria, relations should be friendly, with no mutual distrust, fear, or a proclivity for violence between members of one ethnic or religious group and members of another ethnic or religious group. The control over scarce resources, fuel,

land, economics, traditional and political offices, and traditional and political offices, according to Achumba et al. (2013), resulted in mass deaths and property devastation in many sections of the country.

The Collaboration of Northern Political/Religious Elites

Olaniyan & Asuelime (2014) assert that the Boko Haram insurgency's impact on Nigeria's Christians is rooted in both politics and ethno-religion foundation. Boko Haram is viewed from a religious perspective as being intentionally created by Nigerian Muslims in an effort to exterminate Christians. From a political standpoint, the violent actions are perceived as a plan to topple a government led by a fellow Christian (Thurston, 2012).

Some people believe that Boko Haram is an initiative of the northern political elite created specifically to undermine the former President Goodluck Jonathan administration, a Christian from the south. People from the president's home geopolitical region of the south-south hold this opinion. The South-South Peoples Assembly (SSPA), a group representing residents of the area, asserted in one of its public declarations that:

SSPA does not believe that the Boko Haram of today is the offshoot of the one crushed by the Yar'Adua administration. Rather, we are convinced that the name has become a metaphor for a more sophisticated struggle for political power. We dare say that it is a tool in the hands of those who threatened to make this country ungovernable and who lectured us on the inevitability of violent change in the heat of the struggle for the Jonathan presidency. Boko Haram cannot be pursuing a religious agenda. It should be obvious that exploding bombs in Abuja will do very little to advance the cause of its fanatical Islamic ideology. On the contrary, we are convinced that the group's agenda, clearly that of its urbane sponsors, is to make the presidency of Goodluck Jonathan unworkable" (Onoyume, 2011).

According to this viewpoint, Professor Wole Soyinka has claimed on numerous occasions that the northern politicians are to blame for the rebellion as a means of attacking President Jonathan's administration for losing the 2011 presidential elections to them (Soyinka, 2012).

Information Gathering and Dilapidated Security Device

The nation security architecture is widely seen as lacking in personnel and equipment. Security officers are underpaid, undertrained, and underpaid. As a result, the necessary competence to tackle modern security concerns is lacking. Security personnel's commitment to Nigeria's objective of maintaining general safety is also cause for concern. Corruption, insufficient police and other security agency budget, a lack of modern equipment, poor safety personnel health, and insufficient staff can all contribute to a weak security system.

Access to Fund through Crime and Criminality

One of the ways to reducing terrorism in the nation is the inability for terrorist to obtain funding through unlawful means, such as collecting illegal taxes, kidnapping civilians for ransom, rustling cattle, and kidnapping overseas contributors, among others. The majority of the money used to fund terrorism comes from illegal sources. Regular financial support for terrorist organisations ensures their survival and, consequently, the continuation of their terrorist activities (Okunade and Oni, 2021).

Religious Indoctrination

Both state and non-state actors seem to use religion as the language of politics to further their parochial and localized agenda in the society. More significantly, bloodshed and conflicts with religious overtones have plagued Nigeria's modern history for almost every decade. Thousands of southern Igbos who were Christians was murdered by northern Hausas (Muslims) in 1966, just prior to Nigeria's civil war. At a protest in Kano State in 1980, a clash between the Maitatsine group and the Nigerian Police set off several weeks of unrest that resulted in hundreds of fatalities. In 1991, Muslims reacted to a planned visit by German Christian evangelist Reinhard Bonnke to Nigeria by killing over 200 people—mostly southern Christians—and setting over 20 churches ablaze. 44 Nigerians entered the bloodiest decade in the 2000s, which saw thousands of people die as a result of confrontations between Christians and Muslims and terrorist attacks organised by Boko Haram.

For instance, Anglican Archbishop Peter Akinola described Boko Haram as a planned Islamic jihad against Nigerian Christians during a public sermon. In his words: “Boko Haram is a continuation of Arabia (i.e., Northern Islamic) agenda of 1966 but under a new guise. People of God, don’t be deceived. I urge you to shun all political and religious hypocritical claims by some of our compromised political and religious leaders that Boko Haram attacks were not an Islamic aggression against Christianity”.

The Existence of Porous boarder

There are 1,316 more border control posts than are permitted, according to records from the Nigeria Immigration Service, which show there are over 1,400 unlawful entry points into Nigeria. Nigeria's land border spans 4,047km, and 84 approved border controls are present along that stretch (Babatola, 2015). The key reason encouraging the growth of illicit weapons and insurgencies in Nigeria is the porousness of its borders (Leiter, 2014).

Conclusion

The rise of Islamic extremism in northern Nigeria has contributed to the advent of terrorism, which has significantly weakened the nation's socioeconomic engine. The

terrorist group Boko Haram's actions in Northeast Nigeria have sparked un-favourable responses from groups and nations that have been impacted by those actions, which has harmed Nigeria's relations with other nations across the world. The international community has shown a great deal of interest in the Boko Haram terrorist attacks in Nigeria, raising concerns about the effectiveness of the government's strategy to combat the threat. This is due to the fact that this group's arrogance and daring have persisted unabatedly despite official claims of winning the war, and daily casualties rising is alarming after each attack, causing the general population to lose faith in the government. The conclusion of this paper is that Northeast Nigeria, as well as the converging economic, political and religious reasons that gave rise to and sustained BH activities in Lake Chad basin. Economic deterioration has been fueled by the country's historical political instability and neo-patrimonial practices of the political elite absorbed in acquiring control at the federal level while disregarding development, notably in Northern Nigeria. They also formed the North-South division at the same period. Furthermore, the political elite got preoccupied on constructing an oil nation and neglected other sectors, particularly agriculture, which was Northern Nigeria's economic backbone. Northern Nigeria, which was mired in poverty, provided a breeding ground for several groups, including BH, which was able to tap into broad complaints among the local populace in the north.

The government's incapacity to provide social services to its citizens, as well as corruption and patron-client relationships, created an atmosphere in which citizens could either demand reforms or, if those demands were not met, retaliate against the state machinery. From the foregoing study, politicians turned a blind eye or even sympathized with BH and extended patronage to the group during its early stages for political purposes, setting the groundwork for future upheaval in Northern Nigeria.

Recommendations

1. The border should be restriction to limit influx of persons into the Northeast.
2. Government should also mount a strong guarderism and install CCTV cameras around the border and Sambisa forest to protect the Northeast border and its environs.
3. Religious de-radicalization of the people of the region will be of a great measure to ensure peace and transparencies.
4. Inclusive counter-insurgency strategy operation in the region.
5. Synergy between the security agencies and people of the Northeast to fight and restore peace in the region through information dissemination working hand in hand with each other and blocking all avenue of generating finance by the insurgents in the region such as kidnaping.

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