

Theorising the Negative Impacts of the Niger Delta Development Commission's Social Services in Odi Community, Bayelsa State, Nigeria

Demola Victor Akinyoade PhD

Abstract

The paper focused on the negative impacts of the Niger Delta Development Commission's (NDDC) social services in Odi, one of the communities in the Niger Delta. The negative impacts of the social services in Odi are consequences of the mutual interactions of the interventions and the community context. The study employed a case study research design and data were collected through key informant and in-depth interviews, document and observation. Forty participants were interviewed in 60 face-to-face and mobile-phone interviews. Interviews were recorded, transcribed and later analysed using ATLAS.ti 7.0. Findings show that the pervasive perception of the NDDC's social services as resources triggers feelings of greed and likely deprivation in actors and thus motivated them to struggle for the benefits. This determines and drives the mutual impacts of the social services and the context triggering other negative impacts including the black hole of interactions, malevolent charity-beggar relationship between the Commission and beneficiary community, and oppressiveness and divisiveness of the NDDC interventions. This lends credence to the notion that interventions in conflict context have the potential for negative (conflict exacerbating and peace undermining) impacts.

Keywords: NDDC, Odi, black hole of interactions, resource status of intervention, intervention-context interactions.

Introduction

The need to give special attention to the development of the Niger Delta Region (NDR) has been recognised before oil exploration began in the area and before Nigeria's Independence. It informed the colonial

government's commission of enquiry— Willink Commission of 1957/58— set up to investigate the fears of the minorities and how to allay them. The commission recognised the peculiar developmental needs of the region and recommended a developmental board for the region. To this end, the Nigerian central government, at different times, established specialised agencies to cater to the needs of the region. The Balewa Administration set up the Niger Delta Development Board (NDDB) 1960-1966. The failure of NDDB and the increasing political mobilisation of the various ethnic groups in the region informed the setting up of the Presidential Task Force by the 1979/83 Administration. The Task Force was set up in 1980 and 1.5% of the Federation Account was allocated to it to tackle the developmental problems of the region (Master Plan 2006). The body lasted from 1980-1985. In 1992, the Babangida Administration established the Oil Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) for the provision of infrastructure in the area. OMPADEC lasted from 1992-1999. Through these establishments the people of the NDR have suffered rising expectation, relative deprivation, and frustration. The result has been to engender aggression and violent conflicts among the people.

By the late 1990s, the Niger Delta Region had become a lawless zone, where youths disrupted oil production at will and communities frequently engaged in destructive inter-and intra-community strife at the slightest provocation. This was the situation of things prior to the establishment of the Niger Delta Development Commission as a programme for the sustainable development of the NDR. The National Assembly enacted the NDDC Act, 2000 on the 12th of July, 2000 (The NDDC Act 2000). The NDDC was officially inaugurated on 21st December, 2000, but established in 2001 (NDDC, 2011). In the words of ex-President Obasanjo, *the* “Niger Delta Development Commission has the potential to offer a lasting solution to the socio-economic problems of the Niger Delta people.” (Master Plan 2006). The NDDC's vision is to “offer a lasting solution to the socio-economic difficulties of the Niger Delta Region.” It has the mission “.to facilitate the rapid, even and sustainable development of the Niger Delta into a region that is economically prosperous, socially stable, ecologically regenerative and politically peaceful.” (Master

Plan, 2006). The Directorate of Education, Health and Social Services is one of the 11 directorates established in Part III of the Act. It is responsible for the provision of social services in the study area.

This paper focuses on the negative impacts of the provision of the NDDC social services in Odi between 2006 and 2011. These interventions generally fall within the NDDC Quick Impacts Projects (QIPs) and the early phase (years 1-5) of the implementation of the Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan. They included provision of free healthcare, water schemes, and educational facilities and programmes. The NDDC educational facilities in Odi include the construction of science laboratories and classrooms in public schools; replacement of community school. Others include training on modern agricultural practices including aquaculture, mushroom farming, grass-cutter rearing, beekeeping, and snail rearing. The paper presents the intervention-context interactions (ICI) perspective in the next section. The subsequent sections present phenomena germane to understanding the nature, dynamics and implications of the interactions of the NDDC interventions and the Odi community context. These include resource status of intervention, black hole of interactions, likely deprivation, Ward 12, oppressiveness of intervention, divisiveness of intervention, malevolent charity-beggar relationship, and the geniuses of conflict transformation in the community.

The Context of Odi Community

Odi is an Ijaw community in Kolokuma-Opokuma LGA (with headquarters in Kaiama), Bayelsa State. It is located beside one of the tributary rivers of River Niger, bordered in the north by Odoni and Agbere, in the south by Sampou and Kaiama along the River Nun bank. Its western neighbors are Patani and Abari, while in the east is Okordia Zarama. Its built-up area is 3.85km north-south and 2.6km east-west. Odi has twenty-seven communities (formerly referred to as compounds but rechristened for political reasons) and divided into north (Asanga) and south (Tamanga) parts. There are thirteen communities in Asanga and fourteen in Tamanga. Communities in the north are: Amakiriebi-ama, Amatus, Ebereze, Ede-ama, Ekpevama, Fisin, Ifidi, Keminanabo, Mamuagha, Osiakeme-ama, Ogien-ama, Payo, and Timbo-ama. The south parts consist of: Ayakoro-ama, Bethlehem-ama, Bolou-ama,

Burudani-ama, Ikiri-ama, Ineinfagha/Akangele-ama, Obimo, Oboribengha, Obuka-ama, Ofouwara/Gbagba-ama, Ogboloma, Sounbiri, Tamukunoun, Tonbere-ama. The community has three wards.

There are four cardinal groups in Odi Community. These are the traditional council, the Community Development Committee (CDC), the Youth Council, and the Women Group. The traditional council is headed by His Highness, the Amananaowei (King) and has twenty-seven chiefs representing each of the communities in Odi. Membership in the traditional council is by election. While the Amananaowei is elected for life, the chiefs are elected for a period of three years. Upon the demise of the King, his first son acts as a regent for a period of two years before election is conducted for the next King. Membership of the Youth Council is open to all female and male youths aged fifteen to forty-five who have a maternal or paternal affiliation to the community. Interested individuals register with a token fee to become a member. Any member can vie for elective post by campaigning and seeking vote through elections. Elections are held every two years through an open or secret ballot system. The Youth Council is a vibrant and formidable organisation in the community, with well-articulated twelve-point objectives covering almost every facet of community life.

Divergent views between the Tradition Council and the Youth Council often lead to tension between the two groups. However, in Odi, the Youth Council usually defers to the Traditional Council on many occasions out of respect for the elders and in order to “allow peace to reign. The Women Group, headed by the Ereamini da-arua, comprises every community woman by default. The Ereamini da-arua is chosen by the women themselves to manage their affairs. The current Ereamini da-arua has been in office since the 1999 Odi Massacre. The Community Development Committee (CDC) is a group set up for the development of the community. It is supposedly the community’s contact with any development initiative in the community. Each of the ten members is elected democratically from communities. No community can have more than one member. The group is headed by a chairman. At the time of the fieldwork, the CDC was being reconstituted.

The Odi Massacre is a reference point in the community. The event that led to the massacre is the murder of seven policemen by

hoodlums who were then operating from Odi. On November 20, 1999, in retaliation of the murdered policemen soldiers, surrounded Odi and neighbouring communities. According to the ERA/FOE, Nigeria, report, “[b]y the time the military operation ended, 2,483 people, including women and children, lay dead. Many more were displaced, injured, and traumatised and an inestimable number of properties destroyed.” (Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth 2002: 6). At the time of the fieldwork— eleven years after the massacre— Odi Community has become a peaceful community. There were no open conflicts. However, low intensity dissatisfaction abounded. The massacre was a recurrent theme in the discussions with all the community people.

Mutual Interactions of Interventions and Community Context

As argued by Akinyoade (2018), several authors have convincingly argued the inevitable interactions of intervention and the context where it is situated (Resource Pack 2004; Anderson 1999 & 2004; Bush 2003c & Bush 2009). Works in impact assessment have shown that intervention initiatives in conflict setting do impact on elements of the context and vice versa. Against this notion, the paper conceptualises the interactions using a framework— the intervention-context interactions (ICIs). This serves as the basis and framework for assessing and theorising the impacts of these interactions on the Odi community context. The intervention-context interactions (ICIs) are the mutual interactions between stages of an intervention programming and elements of a given conflict context, with their potentials for positive or negative impacts on the conflict situation (Bush & Opp 1999; Bush 2003a; 2003b; 2003c; Resource Pack 2004).

As noted by Barbolet, Goldwyn, Groenewald, and Sheriff (2005), conceptualising impact in terms of interactions is helpful. They submit “[n]ew thinking on topics such as ‘interaction indicators’ shows promise worthy of application and subsequent learning.” The ICI matrix is based on such thinking. In the matrix, alphabets represent the stages of an intervention and elements of a context. P stands for planning, I for implementation, ME for monitoring and evaluation, while, A stands for actors, C for causes, Pr for profile and D for dynamics.

Figure 1 : Intervention-Context Interactions Matrix

<i>Stages: Planning</i>	<i>Implementation</i>	<i>Monitoring & Evaluation</i>
PA—AP	IA—AI	MEA—AME
PC—CP	IC—CI	MEC—CME
PPr—PrP	IPr—PrI	MEP—PME
PD—DP	ID—DI	MED—DME


Source : (Akinyoade 2010)

PA represents the impact of planning on actors, while AP stands for the impact of actors on planning. PA—AP, therefore, represents the interactions between planning and actors. PA may be positive or negative. Same goes for AP. In essence, in planning-actors' interactions, there are four potential impacts: positive planning-actors (+PA) impact; positive actors-planning (+AP) impact; negative planning-actors impact (-PA); and negative actors-planning (-AP) impact. +PA describes a situation where the planning of an intervention has positive impacts on the actors. Positive AP (+AP) is when actors, through their contributions, impact positively on the planning of an intervention. -PA and -AP are negative impacts of planning on actors and of actors on planning respectively. For instance, planning may involve a party and neglect other(s) or give better treatment or special recognition to a party at the expense of the other(s). This may sustain old tensions or foment new ones among parties. Alternatively, actors' conflict behaviours may disrupt planning or inform bad decisions.

From the foregoing, the planning stage has *four potential impacts* with each of the four elements of the context. In all, it has *sixteen potential impacts* with all the elements of the context— actors, causes, profile and dynamics. These potential impacts have equal numbers (eight each) of both positive and negative “charges.” Similar cases can be made for other stages (implementation and monitoring and evaluation) as well. This brings the total number of *potential impacts* between intervention and contexts to forty-eight— twenty-four potential positive and twenty-four potential negative impacts. This

implies that ICIs carry equal potential to contribute positively or negatively to a given conflict situation.

Figure 2: Intervention-Context Interactions Framework



Source: (Akinyoade 2010)

The ICI framework represents potential, multi-layered, multidirectional interactions between intervention and context. The ICIs potential impacts on the context are in the emergent loop of multi-layered, bi-directional interactions. These interactions produce the dynamics that support peace or conflict in a conflict situation. The ICI perspective measures impact in terms of the implications of the interactions on conflict situations. It shows the measurable potential impacts that interactions of intervention and conflict context have for the conflict situation. Therefore, we can conceive of ICI's *negative impact* and ICI's *positive impact* on a conflict situation. The ICI framework is useful in understanding and explaining the nature, dynamics and implications of the interactions of the NDDC social services and the context of Odi Community. Subsequent sections present phenomena that aid such understanding.

Resource Status of Intervention

A proper understanding of the implications of the ICI within the study area requires an understanding of intervention as a resource within a given context. This is consistent with Anderson's submission that "[a]ll aid programmes involve the transfer of resources (food, shelter, water, health care, training, etc.) into a resource-scarce environment." (1999; 2004; Resource Pack 2004:47). Intervention is perceived as a resource in most contexts because it is a social solution package intended to improve a given social situation. As a solution package, it comes with tangible (e.g. financial and material) and non-tangible (e.g. prestige, influence) benefits. These benefits are potential resources that could be exploited by actors from within (community actors) and outside (external actors) the intended context of the intervention. According to Anderson, "...these resources represent power and wealth and they become an element of the conflict" in context (cited in Resource Pack, 2004:47). Bush concurs with this view when he opines that intervention introduces new dynamics in the context, creating winners and losers (Bush, 2003a) as actors sometimes "...attempt to control and use aid resources to support their side of the conflict and to weaken the other side." (Resource Pack 2004:47).

The NDDC as an intervention agency is a source of resources in the NDR. Its funding is provided in Part V of the NDDC Act:

1. 15 percent of the total monthly statutory allocations due to member States of the Commission from the Federation Account;
2. 3 percent of the total annual budget of any oil producing company operating, onshore and offshore, in the Niger-Delta area; including gas processing companies;
3. 50 percent of monies due to member States of the Commission from the Ecological Fund; and
4. Miscellaneous sources.

These translate into an annual budget of billions of naira. This makes the NDDC and its activities very attractive to all sorts of actors with varied motivations. Empirical evidence suggests that the NDDC interventions are perceived as a resource by both external and

community actors, thus compelling actors, motivated by need, greed, or *likely deprivation* to mobilise and contend to appropriate the intervention's benefits for themselves and their constituencies. Its benefits include federal government jobs, contracts, physical projects and human capacity development programmes and money. As such, it becomes a reason for legitimate and illegitimate motivations to satisfy legitimate needs, actors' insatiable wants and/or opportunity actors do not want to be deprived of. This showcases the impacts of intervention on actors and vice versa. Actors' perception of intervention as a resource is the main driver of the ICI in Odi.

Likely Deprivation

Likely deprivation is a social-psychological and psycho-social condition in which, driven by fear of real possibility or likelihood of deprivation of benefits (including rights, privileges and other opportunities), an individual or group takes actions to secure her/its share of the perceived benefits. Likely deprivation is different from relative deprivation in the sense that the former is a priori (that is, in anticipation of deprivation) while the latter is a-posteriori (that is, consideration of past deprivation relative to others). Likely deprivation is prevalent in socio-political arrangements in which the rights and privileges of citizens are not guaranteed in fair and just processes. Thus, citizens learn to use every means, fair and foul, to secure benefits. Individuals' psychology and groups' social-psychology in Odi is characterised by anticipated deprivation of the benefits/resources of the NDDC unless they struggle for it. This mindset drives the competition, conflict and cooperation over the resources of the NDDC.

Likely deprivation is somehow characteristic of the Nigerian society. It is pronounced in the NDR due to the interplay of the long history of marginalisation and deprivation and the availability of the intervention benefits and other resources to struggle for. Likely deprivation is both a consequence and form of structural cause of conflict in the NDR. It is a manifest form of loss of faith in public institutions to distribute public goods and services in a fair and equitable manner.

The Ward 12

Ward 12 is another important phenomenon in understanding the impacts of the NDDC intervention in Odi. Odi is a community in Kolokuma-Opokuma LGA. The LGA has 11 wards (electoral divisions) three of which are in Odi. The Ward 12 phenomenon according to a respondent refers to "...our people that are living outside, that are in Yenagoa [the state capital and largest Ijaw city], that are close to the government... sometimes even if you are not close to Ward 12 you will not have anything [that is, benefits, including NDDC intervention]." Ward 12 constituency thus includes influential individuals such as the NDDC staff and politicians who are indigenes of various communities and who lobby the NDDC and government on behalf of their communities for a share of the NDDC interventions. How influential a community's Ward 12 members are determines the type, quality and quantity of the NDDC intervention in the community. According to resident community people,

...like if you have somebody there, like we have a daughter there [the NDDC] that is...influential there, hmm, she can work out something and say look come and meet the CEO, see what I've done for the town. Like we have this rest house that was just lying fallow [uncompleted], so, the girl now moved and before we knew, they sent a proposal that this thing should go on.
—Odi Community member, a politician

The road network at Sabagreya is more than this place [Odi]...it's because some of their people are in the NDDC. Even in the state here. The state NDDC representative, the state coordinator or whatever, is from Sabagreya. Then sometimes they also have some of their big men, hmm, they are concerned about the village and so they move to NDDC to lobby for more...projects. They will now liaise with the deputy speaker. The deputy speaker of...the house [the state's House of Assembly] is from Sabagreya too, he's from there. So, all of them will now put heads together, hmm, and then see how they can now [facilitate

NDDC interventions for their community]...it's all about the government...if they are assigning project to you, if it's two kilometres, you lobby for more kilometres. — Odi Youth Council Executive

Members of Ward 12 are usually motivated by the personal desire to increase their influence in the community. Hence, interventions attracted by Ward 12 may not necessarily be needed by members of the community. Moreover, inasmuch as members of Ward 12 do not appropriately consult the members of the community, their involvement in attracting interventions to the community does not constitute community participation in intervention programming.

Black Hole of Interactions (Bhis)

This is the intense interactions between the resource-rich NDDC interventions and influential actors such as NDDC Board members and Management staff, politicians, contractors/consultants, high ranking government officials and the Ward 12. In the Bhis, influential actors lobby, manoeuvre, and negotiate in sharing and exploiting the resources of the NDDC interventions in an environment of non-transparency, bare-faced corruption and endemic bad governance. It is a function of the interplay of the resource status of intervention, likely deprivation, and greed. The existence of the Black hole of interactions is supported by the report of a probe panel and the participants' responses.

The Probe Panel, set up in 2011 and headed by Mr. Steve Orosanye, was to identify factors hindering the Commission from performing its statutory functions. The report indicted the former Managing Director/CEO of the Commission, Mr. Chibuzor Ugwuoha as misappropriating N511 billion in two years. It also indicted consultants of the Commission and aides to the Nigerian President. It led to the dissolution of the NDDC Board, chaired by Air Vice Marshal Larry Koinyan (Rtd.), in September 2011. Corrupt practices identified by the committee include: zero procurement procedure (contrary to the provisions of Section 16 (6-9) and 23 of the Public Procurement Act (PPA), 2007), and lack of pre-qualification processes for projects within the N250 Million approval threshold of the Commission. The

Black hole is a characteristic feature of the NDDC since inception. According to interviewees,

...on the books they [NDDC] seem to be doing it, but it...tilts towards interests. Interest of those who...want to...gain from [it]. Whereby the core people in the rural areas are not benefiting from it. So...you know, even though the office is under the presidency...the oversight...is not really...being done in the way it should. And also, the finances of...the NDDC is not being monitored...You will see a project, ordinarily, that will not cost up to ten million naira...the Commission end up saying it is 100 million, 200 million and nobody questions it. There is no...accountability...You still see...over so many years now that the commission has started, there have not really been emancipation of the Niger Delta region. — An NDDC Consultant, Port Harcourt

But to be frank with you...I'll say that nearly 99.9% of projects are not initiated from the CRD [the NDDC's Directorate of Community and Rural Development] but from the Projects...ok, if I say the Project Directorate or project department, I'll also not be saying it accurately as it is, you know. We hardly do needs assessment... most of the project that get into the budget for implementation come rather from people who are desirous of doing contracts. For example, members of the national assembly, you know. That's how our projects are generated. — NDDC Staff, Desk Officer

The Black hole has a crippling effect on the overall effectiveness of the NDDC social services. It excludes the resident community people (RCP) from the C&P, limits their participation at the implementation stage and discourages their participation at the monitoring and evaluation stage. Some of the activities of the Bhis identified by the Panel include non-compliance with extant regulations

and statutes; acrimonious and poor interpersonal relationship between the Board, the Managing Director, the Executive Directors and among top Management Staff of the Commission (probably due to contention over resources). Others are structural defects and over-centralisation of the Commission's activities; widespread misconception of the role of the Commission by staff and people of the region; ethnicity and fictionalisation. The remaining are routine and rampant externalisation of internal problems and disagreements; ineffective supervision by the supervisory agencies of the Commission; and inadequate funding and staffing of the state offices. The report revealed a characteristic high-level corruption in awarding contracts and that the quality of the NDDC projects is generally far below acceptable standards.

The Black hole jettisons the injunction for transparency, accountability and full participation of critical stakeholders contained in the Master Plan: "It needs to be re-stated that the leadership of the NDDC must uphold the principles of transparency and accountability..." (2006, 241).

The malevolent charity-beggar relationship between the NDDC and Odi

The NDDC intervention programming establishes and sustains acute power disequilibrium between the NDDC and the beneficiary community. (It is an extension of the power disequilibrium characterising citizens-state relationship in Africa where citizens generally feel that government responsibilities towards them are privileges, rather than rights). The power relation confers the status of charity on the NDDC and forces the status of a beggar on the community. Over time, the relationship has become malevolent, due essentially, to the effect of the Black hole. Odi has been made to see the NDDC interventions as a rare "charity" and scarce resource. So, in whatever form it comes to the community— good, bad or ugly— the community dare not reject it. Even if it is clearly not needed or there are significant ways of improving it. According to a participant, "they are developmental projects, people are looking for them and they don't get and you, you have the opportunity to...you are given the opportunity, will you reject it?"

The interventions are privileges that the NDDC endows on those who are in its good records. This relationship is most evident in

the oppressiveness of the Commission’s intervention. The subtle disempowerment of the community starts right from the C&P stage (with the exclusion of the RCP) and runs throughout the entire programming cycle. The community is oppressed when provision of social services put them in a “beggar has no choice” situation. The malevolent charity-beggar relationship makes the NDDC intervention oppressive leading to the phenomenon “oppressiveness of intervention.”

Oppressiveness of Intervention

Empirical evidence suggests that the NDDC interventions are oppressive in Odi. Oppressiveness of intervention is a situation in which beneficiaries are directly oppressed by the intervention either as a consequence of insensitive programming or a by-product of corruption in programming. In the programming of the NDDC intervention, oppressiveness of beneficiaries begins right from the conception and planning stage and runs throughout the entire programming cycle. The existence of this relationship is inferred from community people’s views:

Even if they [NDDC contractor/consultant] meet the paramount ruler, they will just go out and do what they want to do. The paramount ruler has no control over them that this and this are what and what I want in my community so that it won’t bring problems. So, they just come and map out the roads. So, when they come with the contractor, the contractor will just come with his drawing, say “This to this will have one road, from so-so-so kilometre, this, this, this, this or this to this will have another road.” That is all what the consultant will just come to tell you. That “I’m an engineer and I know what I’m telling you. If we go to the road and we measure it, you will see it” just like that. So that’s the way they do their things.— Secretary to the Traditional Council

The moment I hold the file, the file opened and I saw the number of projects meant for the school. And that

was why I begin to see...some of the things that were supposed to be done. And immediately, I fired back, I cried out, but I was silenced from Port Harcourt office. Say that, 'You, a civil servant you don't talk anything, because is it only your community that is there? Are there no other communities?' The people that came from the headquarters office are the same people silencing me from telling the truth. It's funny...so, that's the situation. — Male secondary school teacher.

The oppressiveness of intervention has negative impacts on the intervention programming. It manifests in various forms. The first form is in imperious and imperial manner of excluding RCPs from C&P, thus giving the community no voice in the interventions meant for them. This arrogance suggests that the intervenor assumes to know and could proffer solutions to the problems of the intended beneficiaries without necessarily consulting them. This is tantamount to a doctor treating a conscious patient without consulting her. It presupposes that the RCP do not know what they need. However, NDDC staff argue that since the politicians, the presumed representatives of the people are involved (as Ward 12 actors), the community has been involved. Nevertheless, to assume such and thus limit community participation in C&P to Ward 12 elites suggests naivety or deliberate scheme to cover up the Bhis. Marginalising the entire community people this way entrenches the power imbalance between the Ward 12 and the community people. According to a respondent,

These things [interventions] can only be brought through our big men outside. ...we can do the writing thing but if there's no follow-up from our elite people in the township, they don't care. They don't, they don't care at all (visibly dissatisfied). Because when they were making the roads, we said look, we wanted more roads that will cover certain areas that have not been covered. We wrote that letter but there was no response. — An elderly male beneficiary (retired military man)

Evidently, the NDDC interventions become commodities that the community can enjoy through the benevolence of its elite. Ineffective communication between the community and the Commission ferments dissatisfaction as shown in the elderly man's visible dissatisfaction. Non-participatory intervention programming is the main support for oppressive intervention. The second way that interventions oppress is in the high-handed manner in which the NDDC personnel, contractors/consultants relate with the community when implementing interventions. Third, oppression manifests in the "promise and fail" syndrome, a situation whereby the Commission promises and delivers less than promised or the case of selective distribution of benefits. A case in point is the Commission's practice of paying lower stipends than what it promised its beneficiaries in its agricultural capacity-building programme. A case of selective distribution of benefits is evident in the giving of computers to the leaders of agitators in its computer training programme. This is captured in the view of an elderly female beneficiary,

...the people that came to train promised them that they would give them because...they delayed them in their farming work, they said they will give them 15,000 (Naira) each but they only brought one, one thousand to them. And they said that they heard that they have paid the money into their account and they contributed some amount of money, but still they have not seen anything. – Female Respondent, farmer late 50s or early 60s

The threat of and the use of force against disappointed and protesting beneficiaries is another form of oppressing the community people. This comes in the form of arrest of protesters and exploitation of the community's fear of repetition of the 1999 massacre and fear of further bad publicity for the Odi Community. According to trainees of the agricultural programmes, the Commission asked beneficiaries to form cooperatives in order to access start up loans. After they spent money forming the cooperatives, the Commission failed to make good on its promise.

So, our boys went over to NDDC. They locked our boys, arrested them, locked them. We had to contribute money here again to go and release them.
— Male beneficiary, a politician

Oppressiveness is also evident in the real threat of blacklisting any community the Commission considers troublesome— a decision that is entirely at the Commission’s discretion. Community people’s fear of losing potential interventions, a fear mainly entertained by the community elders, which is regularly exploited by the Commission and its contractors. A protesting community stands the risk of being blacklisted as a “trouble-maker.” This comes with the possibility of stopping the intervention and allocating it to another community as a punishment to the “hostile” community. The fear has become an instrument for pacifying or sometimes beating youths to submission in legitimate and illegitimate agitations. Elders, on the other hand, have become placid. The attitude of the elders is expressed in a participant’s response below.

...anything about development, I don’t want any conflict. Anything that will bring development...there should be no conflict at all because these are things you are not, eh, benefiting from before. Like a community over this way, in the thirties or so, they could have been the first Ijaw...town to get a road but because of their hostility this thing, they [benefactor] withdrew and I think that school that was to be established there too was moved, the utensils were moved to Government College Umuahia. I was told that they are now trying to find the roads now by themselves...Something that could have benefitted the whole community in the thirties, see the development that were missed...manpower development, if that thing has been there since the thirties...that’s what I continue to tell the youths, anything about development, don’t hinder, don’t hinder. Because you will benefit in the long run. — An elderly male elderly beneficiary

The “allow development to take place” attitude, though commendable, is an effective exploitative instrument in subduing the community youths even at such time when they have legitimate reasons to assert their rights as stakeholders in the intervention. According to the Youth Council President:

Sometimes they [the NDDC] will also say that eh, if they [contractors] come to a place and if the community is trying to make trouble, they should pack out of that...community and the project will come to an end. Then our community leaders will now fear. ‘We don’t want what will make this company leave this place o, and all the rest, so nobody to ferment trouble.’ [The elders will] say ‘This company is not going anywhere.’ Company that is looking for their job, they will not go. So sometimes our leaders too, out of fear and maybe their level of understanding, sometimes, you know, do certain things in a different manner to the benefit of the company. You’re not even killing the company; this is what they are supposed to do. Then the leaders will now say ‘Leave this people o, if you worry them too much, if they carry their properties away, we have lost the work. This one that has come we should it — Youth Council President

The Odi 1999 massacre has also been exploited as an instrument of oppression in the NDDC intervention programming in the community. It has a restraining and mollifying impact on the Odi community, thereby making the community to be careful in protesting, even when they have legitimate reasons to do so. It has been employed as self-restraint by the youths themselves or by the elders against the youths. The memory of the incidence is still very real in the community. Though it might have attracted sympathy from NGOs and probably, the NDDC, nevertheless, it appears to also be a source of oppression. Community participants reported:

...you know, because something like Odi is said to be a volatile community because of the 1999 massacre

and all those things...people are a bit very careful. They are very, very much careful about what happens. But I know that the project...the light [electricity] own [agitations] happened because of youths and contractors. That project was almost suspended for one year because of eh, crisis like that. — Male Secondary School Teacher

So, it is youths within themselves, they [say] 'look remember what happened in our community. The town was just burned down. If we do anything now, they'll say we have started. That intimidation! Ah you people have started again; can't you people learn from your mistakes? We'll call FANTANGBE' [a special security task force squad]. And people will say please instead of innocent people to die...(laughs). So, People are intimidated. So, you only grumble if you don't want open confrontation with the special force, you mellow down. Because if you don't take time, what they will do is selective picking[arrest]. — Male Secondary School Teacher

...and when you just think about this community and say if you do anything now, the name will now go up again that Odi people are trying to come up again, all those stuffs. That thing for [will] hold us still and you just stay. — Odi youth council executive

The fear of bad publicity for the community therefore restrains the community people from protests. The relatively few intervention-triggered protests are those that reached the breaking point. Even at that, these were still mellowed down by the effect of the 1999 massacre.

Divisiveness of Intervention

Intervention is by nature divisive. This may be due to the fact that it has its goals and become goals of several actors simultaneously. Intervention triggers greed or the desire to satisfy needs among actors thus inspiring them to deploy their resources in contest for it. In a

context characterised by conflict where actors are already primed and possess soft and hardware for conflict, intervention becomes another goal for which actors compete, creating winners and losers, successful and unsuccessful, the happy and the unhappy. Hence divisiveness is inherent in intervention. In the NDDC intervention in Odi, divisiveness takes the form of unintended effect of intervention and a deliberate divide and rule strategy by the NDDC and its contractors. Intervention divides the community people right from the stage of informing them about it. For instance, the Community Development Committee Chairman reported, “Anything that’s outside the community was where I was involved. So, anything they are doing within the community they don’t want to tell me....”

The comment shows that he feels that there were deliberate attempts to leave the CDC out of the scheme of things in NDDC intervention. The women leader shares similar feelings. Also, the NDDC intervention causes division among and within families. For instance, job opportunities and supply of construction materials split members of families donating land for the intervention. Selective fulfilment of promises to beneficiaries (or “settlement”) of HCDPs also constitutes a form of divisiveness of intervention. As noted by respondents:

...like we that benefited from them, you know, we are very happy. But those people that did not benefit from them, some of them are not happy.

And they [NDDC] promised that they will pay them some amount of money but the head ones [leaders], that is, the higher ones, ah, they don’t..., she doesn’t know whether they bring them money or they did not bring. But they [other beneficiaries] hear that they brought the money and people eat [embezzled] the money. — Elderly female beneficiary, farmer.

The one person [NDDC computer skill trainee], which I came across, he told me categorically that the NDDC promised, so with agitations they only settled persons in the frontline. So that there will be no pressure on them. — Male beneficiary, graduate.

We always tell them [youths] that this is a development programme. NDDC comes with development. NDDC is not an oil Company that you will say because of this and that... Allow development to take place. Allow development to take place [for emphasis].

Also, through a ‘divide and rule’ strategy, the NDDC contractors deliberately divide the community for their selfish interest.

...the companies even pay him [former youth president]...so that they [contractor] will take the youth president to themselves so that if there is any conflict that is trying to arise from the youth group in the community, you know that the president will know... — Youth Council Executive

The NDDC interventions divide. Competition and conflict over the resources of intervention create winners and losers from the C&P stage (among the influential actors) and at the implementation stage among community people. It divides the influential actors in the Black hole of interactions at the C&P stage. At the implementation stage, it regularly pitches groups in the community against each other— women group against the traditional council, women against men, thus dividing the community people along gender lines; the youth against the traditional council. It also divides the community along the traditional Asanga-Tamanga geographic line. The division penetrates to the family level as family members are pitched against each other in an attempt to appropriate direct and indirect benefits of the NDDC.

Geniuses of Conflict Transformation

There are prominent traditional and contemporary institutions and/or groups in Odi Community that actively participate in cultural, economic, political and social activities of the community. They are therefore inevitably involved in the NDDC interventions brought into the community. These include the Traditional Council, the Youth Council, the Women Group and the Community Development

Committee. These groups frequently have divergent goals as regards the NDDC interventions. However, they have evolved norms, processes and practices that enable them to manage intervention-triggered competition and conflicts arising among themselves, other members/groups in the community or between Odi and other communities to ensure a peaceful *genius loci* for the community. These groups and their activities including the norms, processes and practices governing them and their relationships constitute the *geniuses* of intervention-triggered conflict transformation in Odi. Essentially, they constitute Mary Anderson's local capacities for peace. However, the Commission does not make deliberate effort to strengthen these capacities, rather, it inadvertently and sometimes deliberately weakens them. The *geniuses* have the credit of keeping Odi peaceful in spite of the NDDC's peace and conflict blind approach to intervention programming in the community.

Conclusions

Certain phenomena are critical in understanding the nature, causes, and dynamics; and the short-term and the long-term implications of the interactions of the NDDC intervention and Odi context. The NDDC interventions are perceived as resources by various actors. Thus perceived, it compels actors' mobilisation to compete and contest for its benefits. Actors' mobilisation drives the interactions of intervention and context thus impacting the causes, profile and dynamics of context. Hence, the perception of intervention as resources—the resource status of intervention—is the epicentre and driving force for the ICIs in Odi Community. Moreover, individuals and groups in Odi experience likely deprivation, which is a pervasive psychological and social-psychological feeling of high possibility of deprivation of the NDDC benefits except they struggle and fight for it. Odi has influential individuals (Ward 12) who, for various reasons, lobby the NDDC for interventions on behalf of their community. The desire to appropriate the NDDC resource leads to intense interactions among influential actors—the Black hole of interactions—which is supported by endemic bad governance and corruption in the NDR. The Black hole exerts strong negative influence on the entire intervention programming

cycle making the intervention programming non-participatory for the resident community people.

This leads to phenomenon such as the malevolent charity-beggar relationship, which is an acute power disequilibrium characterising the Commission-Community relationship in the intervention programming. This relationship manifests in the form of oppressiveness of intervention and leads to divisiveness of intervention. However, geniuses of conflict transformation exist in Odi, mediate the conflict inducing impacts of the NDDC intervention in the community to ensure that the genius loci of the community are peaceful. To minimise the negative impacts of the NDDC intervention in Odi requires shifting the power disequilibrium in favour of the community. This will involve active participation of the RCP (as represented by leaders of the four cardinal groups in the community) throughout the intervention programming.

References

- Africa Peace Forum, Center for Conflict Resolution, Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, Forum on Early Warning and Early Response, International. 2004. *Conflict-sensitive approaches to development, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding. A Resource Pack*. London: Author.
- Aina, Olabisi Idowu, Gbemiga Adeyemi, Adisa Waziri, and Ranti Samuel. 2009. "Labor and Gender Issues in the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industries." In *Nigerian Extractive Industry*. DFID/C4C .
- Akinwale, Akeem Ayofe, and Evans Osabuohien. 2009. "Re-engineering The NDDC'S Master Plan: An Analytical Approach." *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa* (Clarion University of Pennsylvania) 11 (2): 142-159.
- Akinyoade, Demola Victor. 2004. *Towards A Conflict Sensitive Development: Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment of the Niger Delta Development Commission's Development Interventions in Ilaje Local Government Area*. Ibadan: Unpublished Masters Dissertation, Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan.
- Akinyoade, Demola. 2011. "Intervention-Context Interaction: Measuring Impact in Terms of Conflict Situation." In *Peace, Development and Security in Nigeria*, edited by Isaac O. Albert and Danjibo. Ibadan: John Archers and SPSP .
- Akinyoade, Demola. Forthcoming. "Ontology and Epistemology of Peace and Conflict Studies." *The Security Sector and Conflict Management in Nigeria*. Ibadan: Institute of African Studies.
- Akinyoade, Demola. 2010. "Peace and Conflict Sensitive Programming." *Journal of Alternative Perspectives in the Social Sciences* 2 (2): 768-793.
- Akinyoade, Demola. Forthcoming. "Theories in Peace and Conflict Research."
- Akpan, F.U. 2007. "Dousing the tension in the Niger delta through administrative agency: A programme evaluation of Niger Delta Development Commission as an intervention regime." *Global Journal of social Sciences* 6 (1): 85-92.

- Alagoa, Ebiegberi J. 2003. "The Ijaw and the Niger-Delta in Nigerian History." *Keynote address at the "Boro Day" celebrations of the Ijaw National Alliance of the Americas (INAA) on May 24, 2003.* Woodbridge, New Jersey. 1-9.
- Alagoa, Ebiegberi, J. 1999. *The Ijaw Nation in the New Millennium.* Port Harcourt: Onyoma Publications.
- Albert, Isaac Olawale. 2001a. *Building Peace, Advancing Democracy: Experience with Third-party Intervention in Nigeria's Conflicts.* Edited by Isaac Olawale Albert. Ibadan, Oyo: PETRAF/John Archers.
- . 2001. *Introduction to Third-Party Intervention in Community Conflicts.* Ibadan, Oyo: John Archers Publishers Limited.
- Albert, Isaac Olawale, interview by Rita Kiki Edozie. 2008. *The Niger Delta Conflict* (July 30).
- Alemika, E.O. 2002. "Epistemological Foundations of the Scientific Method." In *Interdisciplinary Methodologies in the Social Sciences*, edited by Layi Erinosh, Isaac Obasi and Anthony Maduekwe, 1-31. Abuja: UNESCO Abuja & Social Science Academy of Nigeria.
- Anderson, Mary, B. 1999. *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace — Or War.* Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- . 2004. *Experiences with Impact Assessment: Can we know the Good we Do?* Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management. Accessed May 23, 2011. <http://www.berghof-handbook.net>.
- Baker, T.L. 1999. *Doing Social Research.* Third. Singapore: McGraw Hill Company Inc.
- Bangura, Abdul Karim, and Erin McCandless. 2007. "The State of Peace and Conflict Studies and Peace-building and Development." In *Peace Research for Africa: Critical Essays on Methodology*, edited by Erin McCandless, Abdul Karim Bangura, Mary E. King and Ebrima Sall, 29-54. Addis Ababa: University for Peace Africa Programme.
- Barbolet, Adams, Rachel Goldwyn, Hesta Groenewald, and Andrew Sheriff. 2005. "The Utility and Dilemmas of Conflict Sensitivity."

- Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management.*
Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.
Accessed May 23, 2008. <http://www.berghof-handbook.net>.
- Bush, Kenneth. 1998. "A Measure of Peace: Peace and Conflict impact Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects in Conflict Zones. Working Paper No.1. The Peace building and Conflict reconstruction Program initiative & evaluation Unit." Accessed September 21st, 2011. http://www.ceipaz.org/images/contenido/A%20Measure%20of%20Peace_%20Peace%20And%20Conflict%20Impact%20Assessment.pdf.
- Bush, Kenneth. 2009. *Aid for Peace: A Handbook for Applying Peace & Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) to PEACE III Projects.* Version 1.0 (AfP). University of Ulster; INCORE & United Nations University.
- Bush, Kenneth. 2005. "Field Notes—Fighting Commodification and Disempowerment in the Development Industry: Things I learned about PCIA in Habarana and Mindanao." In *New Trends in Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)*, by Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management, 27-48. Berlin: Author.
- Bush, Kenneth . 2003c. *Hands-on PCIA (Part one): A Handbook of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA).* Author's Version.
- Bush, Kenneth. 2003a. "Hands-on Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)." In *Walking the Path of Peace: Practicing the Culture of Peace and Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment. A Resource Kit.*, by Philipines-Canada Local Government Support Programme (LGSP), 71-129. Manila: Philipines-Canada Local Government Support Programme (LGSP).
- Bush, Kenneth. 2003b. "PCIA Five Years on: The Commodification of an Idea." In *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment: Critical Views on Theory and Practice*, by Alex Austin, Martina Fischer and Oliver Wils, edited by Alex Austin, Martina Fischer and Oliver Wils, 38-52. Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management.
- Bush, Kenneth. D, and Robert J. Opp. 1999. "Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment." In *Cultivating Peace: Conflict and Collaboration in*

- Natural Resource Management*, edited by Daniel Buckles, 185-204. Ottawa: International Development Research Centre in collaboration with the World Bank Institute of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank.
- Cole, Laurie, Ruth Anne Mitchell, Gerald Ohlsen, Gianna Rinaldi, and Godwin Unumeri. 2008. *Exploring Conflict Sensitive Programming in the Niger Delta: A Rough Guide for the Practitioner*. Ottawa: Peacebuild: Conflict Prevention Working Group.
- Conflict Prevention and Post-Conflict Reconstruction (CPR) Network Resource. 2005. *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) Handbook*. Version 2.2 September. Author.
- Courson, Elias. 2006. *Odi Revisited?: Oil and State Violence in Odioma, Brass LGA, Bayelsa State*. Working Paper No 7-r, Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley. USA: The United States Institute of Peace, Washington DC, USA; Our Niger Delta, Port Harcourt, Nigeria, Berkeley; Washington; Port Harcourt: Institute of International Studies; The United States Institute of Peace; Our Niger Delta, 25.
- Courson, Elias. 2007. *The Burden of Oil Social Deprivation and Political Militancy in Gbaramatu Clan, Warri South West LGA*. Working Paper No. 15, Berkeley; Washington DC; Port Harcourt: Institute of International Studies, University of California; The United States Institute of Peace; Our Niger Delta; 51.
- Cunningham, William. 1998. *Theoretical Framework for Conflict Resolution*. Auckland, North Island.
- Dane, Francis C. 1999. *Research Methods*. Belmont: Brooks/Cole Publishing Company.
- Dennen, Johan M.G. van der. 2005. "Frustration and Aggression (F-A) Theory." Accessed November 17, 2008. <http://rechten.eldoc.ub.rug.nl/FILES/departments/Algemeen/overigepublicaties/2005enouder/A-FAT/A-FAT.pdf>.
- Dike, R.O. 1956. *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta 1830-1885*. London: OUP.

- Environmental Rights Action/Friends of the Earth. 2002. *A Blanket of Silence: Images of the Odi Genocide*. Author, 61.
- Fischer, Martina, and Oliver Wils. 2003. *Ploughing Through the Field: An Introduction to the PCIA Handbook Debate*. Berlin: Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management.
- Fisher, Simon; Dekha Ibrahim Abdi; Jawed Ludin; Richard Smith; Steve Williams; Sue Williams. 2000. *Working with Conflict – Skills and Strategies for Action*. London: Zed Books.
- Friese, Susanne. 2011. *ATLAS.ti 6 User Guide and Reference*. Berlin: ATLAS.ti Scientific Software Development.
- Glaser, Barney G. 1998. *Doing Grounded Theory: Issues and Discussions*. California: Sociology Press.
- Human Rights Watch. 1999. *The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria's Oil-producing Communities*. Author.
- Human Rights Watch. 2003. *The Warri Crisis: Fuelling Violence*. Author.
- Ibaba, S. I. 2007. "Understanding Oil Company-Community Conflicts in the Niger Delta (Nigeria)." *Peace and Conflict Studies*, Vol. 14, No 1.
- Ibeanu, Okechukwu. 2006. *Civil Society and Conflict Management in the Niger Delta*. Monograph Series. Ikeja: Cleen Foundation.
- Ikime, Obaro. 1969. *Niger Delta Rivalry: Itsekiri-Urhobo Relations and the European Presence 1884-1936*. London: Longman.
- Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution. October 2002. *IPCR-Strategic Conflict Assessment of Nigeria (Consolidated Report)*. Abuja: The Presidency, Federal Government of Nigeria.
- International Crisis Group. 3 August 2006a. *The Swamps of Insurgency: Nigeria's Delta Unrest*. Africa Report No. 115, 3 August, Africa Report No. 115, Author.
- International Crisis Group. 28 September 2006b. *Fuelling the Niger Delta Crisis*. Africa Report No. 118, Author.
- International Crisis Group. 25 October 2006c. *Nigeria's Faltering Federal Experiment*. Africa Report No 119, Africa Report No 119, Author.

- _____. n.d. *Introduction to Designing Qualitative Research*. Accessed March 12, 2012. <http://trochim.human.cornell.edu/kb/gif/kbroad.gif>.
- Irobi, E. G. 2005. *Ethnic Conflict Management in Africa: A Comparative Case Study of Nigeria and South Africa*. May. Accessed July 22, 2008.
- Isumonah, Adefemi Victor. 2003. "The Obasanjo Administration and the Management of Niger Delta Conflicts in Nigeria." *African Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies* (Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Ibadan) 1 (2).
- Isumonah, V. Adefemi, and Jaye Gaskia. 2001. *Ethnic Groups and Conflicts in Nigeria*. Ibadan: Programme on Ethnic and Federal Studies.
- King, Mary E., and Ebrima Sall. 2007. "Introduction: Research and Education Fundamental to Peace and Security." In *Peace Research for Africa: critical essays on methodologies*, by Erin and Abdul Karim Bangura, Mary E. King and Ebrima Sall McCandless, 9-28. Addis Ababa: University for Peace, Africa Programme.
- Lange, Maria. 2004. *Building Institutional Capacity for Conflict-Sensitive Practices: The Case of International NGOs*. London: International Alert.
- Manby, B. 1999. *The Price of Oil: Corporate Responsibility and Human Rights Violations in Nigeria's Oil-Producing Communities*. USA: Human Rights Watch.
- McCandless, Erin. 2007a. "Peace and Conflict Studies: Origins, Defining Issues, Current Status." In *Peace Research for Africa: Critical Essays on Methodology*, by Erin McCandless and Abdul Karim Bangura, 40-46. Addis Ababa: University for Peace Africa.
- McCandless, Erin. 2007. "Synopsis of Major Concepts." In *Peace Research for Africa: Critical Essays on Methodologies*, by Erin and Abdul Karim Bangura, Mary E. King and Ebrima Sall McCandless, 83-110. Addis Ababa: University for Peace, Africa Programme.

- McCandless, Erin. 2007b. "The Emergence of Peace-building and Development: Scholarship and Practice." In *Peace Research for Africa: Critical Essays on Methodology*, edited by Erin McCandless, Abdul Karim Bangura, Mary E King and Ebrima Sall, 47-52. Addis Ababa: University for Peace.
- Murray, Rowena. 2006. *How to Write a Thesis*. Second. Berkshire: Open Press University.
- NCRFW. N.D. *Gender 101 Gender Sensitivity*. Accessed June 17, 2012. www.ncrfw.gov.ph.
- Neufeldt, Reina C. 2007. "Frameworkers" and "Circlers" –Exploring Assumptions in Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment. Berlin: Berghof.
- Newsom, Chris. June 2011. *Conflict in the Niger Delta: More than a local affair*. Special Report 271, United States Institute of Peace, Washington: United State Institute of Peace, 20.
- Newsrom, Chris. 2011. *Conflict in the Niger Delta: More than a local affair*. Washington: United State Institute of Peace.
- Niger Delta Development Commission. 2012. Accessed June 30, 2012. www.nddc.gov.ng.
- Niger Delta Development Commission. 2006. *Niger Delta Regional Development Master Plan*. Port Harcourt: Author.
- O' Connor, Helen, and Nancy Gibson. "A Step-by-Step Guide to Qualitative Data Analysis." *Pimatiziwin: A Journal of Aboriginal and Indigenous Community Health* 1 (1): 63-90.
- Ogbogbo, C.B.N. 2004. "Niger Delta and the Resource Control Conflict." *Niger Delta and the Resource Control Conflict*. Ibadan, Oyo.
- Paffenholz, Thania. 2006. *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment Tip Sheet*. Fact Sheet, Conflict Prevention and Transformation Division (COPRET), Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, SDC, Bern: Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation, SDC, 4.
- Paffenholz, Thania. 2005. "Third-generation PCIA: Introducing the Aid for Peace Approach." In *New Trends in Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment*, by Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management, 49-75. Berlin: Author.

- Austin, Alex, Martiner Fischer, and & Oliver Wils, . 2003. *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment: Critical Reviews on Theory and Practice*. <http://www.berghof-handbook.net/dialogue-series/no-1-peace-and-conflict-impact-assessment.-critical-views-from-theory-and/>.
- Punch, Keith, F. 1998. *Introduction to social research: quantitative and qualitative approaches*. London: Sage Publication Ltd.
- Raji, Ganiyu Alade. Forthcoming. “Amakusowe: An Ingenious Leadership Symbol of Managing Ijaw Youth Militancy in the Niger Delta.”
- Ross, Marc Howard. 2003. “PCIA as a Peacebuilding Tool.” In *Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment: Critical reviews on theory and practice*, edited by Alex Austin, Martina Fischer and Oliver Wills, 78-81. Berlin: Berghof Centre for Constructive Conflict Management.
- Salihu, Amina, Emem Okon, and Ndeye Sow. 2002. *Enhancing the Capacity of Women Leaders of Community Organisations to Contribute Towards Peace Building in the Niger Delta Region of Nigeria*. Needs Assessment Report Niger Delta Nigeria, London: International Alert, 34.
- Schelling, Thomas. 1960. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Schmelzle, Beatrix. 2005. “Introduction.” In *New Trends in Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)*, 1-9. Berlin: Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management. <http://www.berghof-handbook.net/dialogue-series/no.-4-new-trends-in-peace-and-conflict-impact-assessment-pcia>.
- The NDDC. 2007. *The Niger Delta Development Commission*. Accessed November 27, 2007. <http://www.nddc.ng.gov>.
- The Nigerian National Assembly. 2000. *The Niger Delta Development Commission Act*. PDF Version. Abuja: Author.
- Trochim, William M.K. 2006. *Qualitative Methods*. October 20. Accessed March 22, 2012. <http://www.socialresearchmethods.net/kb/>.
- United Nations Development Programme. 2006. *Niger Delta Human Development Report*. Abuja: Author.

- United Nations Development Programme. 2006. *Niger Delta Human Development Report*. Abuja: Author.
- United Nations General Assembly. 1979. "The Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women." Geneva: Author. Accessed June 2011. <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/text/econvention.htm>.
- University for Peace Africa Programme. 2007. "Guidelines for Policy and Practice-Relevant Research." Chap. 3 in *Peace Research for Africa: Critical Essays on Methodology*, by Erin McCandless, Abdul Karim Bangura, Mary E. King and Ebrima Sall, edited by Erin McCandless, Abdul Karim Bangura, Mary E. King and Ebrima Sall, 71-82. Addis Ababa: Author.
- Wakhweya, Angela M. No Date. *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace-Or War (A Review)*. Accessed September 14, 2012.